Prepared for Members and Committees of Congress

CRS Report for Congress
Prepared for Members and Committees of Congress
Central America Regional Security Initiative:
Background and Policy Issues for Congress
Peter J. Meyer
Analyst in Latin American Affairs
Clare Ribando Seelke
Specialist in Latin American Affairs
March 30, 2011
Congressional Research Service
7-5700
www.crs.gov
R41731
Central America Regional Security Initiative: Background and Policy Issues for Congress
Congressional Research Service
Summary
Central America faces significant security challenges. Criminal threats, fragile political and
judicial systems, and social hardships such as poverty and unemployment contribute to
widespread insecurity in the region. Consequently, improving security conditions in these
countries is a difficult, multifaceted endeavor. Because U.S. drug demand contributes to regional
security challenges and the consequences of citizen insecurity in Central America are potentially
far-reaching, the United States is collaborating with countries in the region to implement and
refine security efforts.
Criminal Threats
Well-financed drug trafficking organizations (DTOs), along with transnational gangs and other
organized criminal groups, threaten to overwhelm Central American governments.
Counternarcotics efforts in Colombia and Mexico have put pressure on DTOs in those countries.
As a result, many DTOs have increased their operations in Central America, a region with fewer
resources and weaker institutions with which to combat drug trafficking and related criminality.
Increasing flows of narcotics through Central America are contributing to rising levels of violence
and the corruption of government officials, both of which are weakening citizens’ support for
democratic governance and the rule of law. Given the transnational character of criminal
organizations and their abilities to exploit ungoverned spaces, some analysts assert that insecurity
in Central America poses a potential threat to the United States.
Social and Political Factors
Throughout Central America, underlying social conditions and structural weaknesses in
governance inhibit efforts to improve security. Persistent poverty, inequality, and unemployment
leave large portions of the population susceptible to crime. Given the limited opportunities other
than emigration available to the expanding youth populations in Central America, young people
are particularly vulnerable. At the same time, underfunded security forces and the failure to fully
implement post-conflict institutional reforms initiated in several countries in the 1990s have left
police, prisons, and judicial systems weak and susceptible to corruption.
Approaches to Central American Security
Despite these challenges, Central American governments have attempted to improve security
conditions in a variety of ways. Governments in the “northern triangle” countries of Central
America have tended to adopt more aggressive approaches, including deploying military forces to
help police with public security functions and enacting tough anti-gang laws. Governments in
other countries have emphasized prevention activities, such as intervention programs that focus
on strengthening families of at-risk youth. Central American nations have also sought to improve
regional cooperation, given the increasingly regional nature of the threats they face.
U.S. Assistance
To address growing security concerns, the Obama Administration has sought to develop
collaborative partnerships with countries throughout the Western Hemisphere. In Central
America, this has taken the form of the Central America Regional Security Initiative (CARSI).
Central America Regional Security Initiative: Background and Policy Issues for Congress
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Originally created in FY2008 as part of the Mexico-focused counterdrug and anticrime assistance
package known as the Mérida Initiative, CARSI takes a broad approach to the issue of security,
funding various activities designed to support U.S. and Central American security objectives. In
addition to providing the seven nations of Central America with equipment, training, and
technical assistance to support immediate law enforcement and interdiction operations, CARSI
seeks to strengthen the capacities of governmental institutions to address security challenges as
well as the underlying economic and social conditions that contribute to them. Between FY2008
and FY2010, the United States provided Central America with $260 million through
Mérida/CARSI. The Obama Administration requested $100 million for CARSI in FY2011 and an
additional $100 million for CARSI in FY2012.
Scope of This Report
This report examines the extent of the security problems in Central America, the current efforts
being undertaken by Central American governments to address them, and U.S. support for Central
American efforts through the Central America Regional Security Initiative. It also raises potential
policy issues for congressional consideration such as funding levels, human rights concerns, and
how CARSI relates to other U.S. government policies.
Central America Regional Security Initiative: Background and Policy Issues for Congress
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Contents
Introduction ………………………………………………………………………………………………………………..1
Background: Scope of the Problem …………………………………………………………………………………4
Underlying Societal Conditions…………………………………………………………………………………5
Structural Weaknesses in Governance…………………………………………………………………………6
Criminal Threats …………………………………………………………………………………………………….7
Drug Trafficking Organizations……………………………………………………………………………7
Gangs ……………………………………………………………………………………………………………..9
Other Criminal Organizations…………………………………………………………………………….10
Efforts Within Central America ……………………………………………………………………………………. 11
Law Enforcement Approaches…………………………………………………………………………………12
Prevention……………………………………………………………………………………………………………14
Counterdrug Efforts ………………………………………………………………………………………………15
Regional Security Efforts ……………………………………………………………………………………….16
U.S. Policy………………………………………………………………………………………………………………..17
Background on Assistance to Central America……………………………………………………………18
Central America Regional Security Initiative……………………………………………………………..19
Formulation ……………………………………………………………………………………………………19
Funding from FY2008-FY2012………………………………………………………………………….20
Programs ……………………………………………………………………………………………………….22
Implementation……………………………………………………………………………………………….25
Performance Measures ……………………………………………………………………………………..26
Additional Issues for Congressional Consideration…………………………………………………………..27
Funding Issues ……………………………………………………………………………………………………..27
Human Rights Concerns…………………………………………………………………………………………29
Relation to Other U.S. Government Policies………………………………………………………………30
Outlook…………………………………………………………………………………………………………………….32
Figures
Figure 1. Map of Central America …………………………………………………………………………………..3
Figure 2. Crime Victimization Rates in Mexico and Central America…………………………………….5
Figure 3. Central American Drug Trafficking Routes………………………………………………………….8
Tables
Table 1. Estimated Homicide Rates in Central America and Mexico, 2005-2010……………………..4
Table 2. Estimated Cocaine Seizures in 2010, by Country………………………………………………….16
Table 3. Funding for the Central America Regional Security Initiative, FY2008-FY2012………..21
Table 4. Status of Central America Regional Security Initiative Funds, March 2011……………….26
Table A-1. Central America Development Indicators ………………………………………………………..34
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Table A-2. Central America Poverty and Inequality Indicators……………………………………………35
Appendixes
Appendix. Central America Social Indicators ………………………………………………………………….34
Contacts
Author Contact Information …………………………………………………………………………………………35
Acknowledgments ……………………………………………………………………………………………………..35
Central America Regional Security Initiative: Background and Policy Issues for Congress
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Introduction
The security situation in Central America1
has deteriorated in recent years as gangs, drug
traffickers, and other criminal groups have expanded their activities in the region, contributing to
escalating levels of crime and violence that have alarmed citizens and threaten to overwhelm
governments. Violence is particularly intense in the “northern triangle” countries of El Salvador,
Guatemala, and Honduras, which have some of the highest homicide rates in the world. Citizens
of nearly every Central American nation now rank public insecurity as the top problem facing
their countries.2
Moreover, some analysts maintain that the pervasive lack of security in the
region not only threatens Central American governments and civil society, but presents a potential
threat to the United States.3
Given the proximity of Central America, instability in the region—
whether in the form of declining support for democracy as a result of corrupt governance, drug
traffickers acting with impunity as a result of weak state presence, or increased emigration as a
result of economic and physical insecurity—is likely to affect the United States.
Although some analysts assert that the current situation in Central America presents a greater
threat to regional security than the civil wars of the 1980s,4
policymakers have only recently
begun to offer increased attention and financial support to the region. During the 1980s, the
United States provided Central America with an average of nearly $1.4 billion annually in
economic and military assistance to support efforts to combat leftist political movements.5
U.S.
attention to the region declined significantly in the early 1990s, however, as the civil wars ended
and Cold War concerns faded. Prior to the introduction of the Mérida Initiative in FY2008, the
bulk of U.S. security assistance to the hemisphere was concentrated in Colombia and the other
narcotics-producing nations of the Andean region of South America. The United States provided
Central America with some assistance for narcotics interdiction and institutional capacity
building, but the funding levels were comparatively low. Central America has received higher
levels of U.S. security assistance as a result of the Mérida Initiative; however, just $260 million of
the $1.76 billion provided through Mérida and its successor programs between FY2008 and
FY2010 was allocated to Central America, with the remainder going to Mexico.6
Recognizing that U.S.-backed efforts in Colombia and Mexico have provided incentives for
criminal groups to move into Central America and other areas where they can exploit institutional
weaknesses to continue their operations, the Obama Administration has sought to develop
collaborative security partnerships with countries throughout the hemisphere. As part of this
effort, the Administration re-launched the Central America portion of the Mérida Initiative as the

1
For the purposes of this report, “Central America” includes all seven countries of the isthmus: Belize, Costa Rica, El
Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, Nicaragua, and Panama.
2
Corporación Latinobarómetro, Informe 2010, Santiago, Chile, December 2010.
3
Bob Killebrew and Jennifer Bernal, Crime Wars: Gangs, Cartels and U.S. National Security, Center for a New
American Security, Washington, DC, September 2010.
4
Steven S. Dudley, Drug Trafficking Organizations in Central America: Transportistas, Mexican Cartels and Maras,
Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars Mexico Institute & the University of San Diego Trans-Border
Institute, Working Paper Series on U.S.-Mexico Security Collaboration, May 2010.
5
Figure is in constant, 2009 dollars. U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID), U.S. Overseas Loans and
Grants: Obligations and Loan Authorizations, July 1, 1945-September 30, 2009, http://www.usaid.gov/policy/
greenbook.html.
6
For information on the Mérida Initiative in Mexico, see CRS Report R41349, U.S.-Mexican Security Cooperation: the
Mérida Initiative and Beyond, by Clare Ribando Seelke and Kristin M. Finklea.
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Central America Regional Security Initiative (CARSI) in FY2010. CARSI takes a broad approach
to the issue of security that goes well beyond the traditional focus on preventing narcotics from
reaching the United States. According to Assistant Secretary of State for Western Hemisphere
Affairs Arturo Valenzuela, ensuring the safety and security of all citizens is one of the four
overarching priorities of current U.S. policy toward Latin America and the Caribbean.7
Accordingly, CARSI not only provides equipment, training, and technical assistance to support
immediate law enforcement and interdiction operations, but also seeks to strengthen the
capacities of governmental institutions to address security challenges and the underlying
economic and social conditions that contribute to them. Although Central American countries
express appreciation for the funds provided, they maintain that the assistance could better respond
to host country priorities and is insufficient given the scale of the region’s security challenges.8
Congress has closely tracked the implementation of the Mérida Initiative/CARSI since its
inception. Nearly three years after Congress first appropriated funding, a number of analysts
assert that extensive long-term U.S. support will be necessary for Central America to successfully
overcome its current security challenges.9
As Congress evaluates budget priorities and debates the
form of U.S. security assistance to the region, it may examine the scope of the security problems
in Central America, the current efforts being undertaken by the governments of Central America
to address these problems, and how the United States has supported those efforts. This report
provides background information about these topics and raises potential policy issues regarding
U.S.-Central America security cooperation—such as funding levels, human rights concerns, and
how CARSI relates to other U.S. government policies—that Congress may opt to consider.

7
The other three overarching priorities are building effective institutions of democratic governance, promoting social
and economic opportunity for everyone, and securing a clean energy future. Testimony of Arturo A. Valenzuela,
Assistant Secretary of State for Western Hemisphere Affairs, U.S. Department of State, before the Senate
Subcommittee on the Western Hemisphere, Peace Corps, and Global Narcotics Affairs, February 17, 2011.
8
CRS interviews with Central American embassy officials, October 27, November 2, 3, and 9, 2010.
9
Killebrew & Bernal, September 2010, op. cit.; Diana Villiers Negroponte, “Understanding and Improving Mérida,”
Americas Quarterly, Spring 2010.
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Figure 1. Map of Central America
Source: CRS.
Notes: The “northern triangle” countries (El Salvador, Guatemala, and Honduras) are pictured in orange.
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Background: Scope of the Problem
As in neighboring Mexico, the countries of Central America—particularly the “northern triangle”
countries of El Salvador, Guatemala, and Honduras—are dealing with escalating homicides and
generalized crime committed by drug traffickers, gangs, and other criminal groups. While the
drug trafficking-related violence in Mexico10 has captured U.S. policymakers’ attention, the even
more dire security situation in many Central American countries has received considerably less
focus or financial support from the United States.11 In 2010, the homicide rate per 100,000 people
in Mexico stood at roughly 18, a rate exceeded by that of Belize (39), El Salvador (66),
Guatemala (50), Honduras (77), and Panama (21) (see Table 1). Moreover, according to recent
polling data, even Central American countries with relatively low homicide rates, such as Costa
Rica and Nicaragua, have victimization rates for common crime (a term that includes robbery and
assault) on par with Mexico (see Figure 2). As enforcement efforts in Mexico have intensified,
the security challenges facing Central America, a region with significantly fewer resources and
weaker institutions than its northern neighbor, have multiplied.12
Table 1. Estimated Homicide Rates in Central America and Mexico, 2005-2010
Homicides per 100,000 Inhabitants
Country 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010
Belize 28 31 30 32 32 39
Costa Rica 8 8 8 11 12 n/a
El Salvador 62 65 57 52 71 66
Guatemala 44 47 45 48 53 50
Honduras 37 46 50 58 67 77
Nicaragua 13 13 13 13 13 n/a
Panama 11 11 13 19 24 21
Mexico 11 11 10 12 15 18
Sources: For 2005-2008, data for Central America are drawn from U.N. Development Program, Informe Sobre
Desarrollo Humano Para América Central 2009-2010: Abrir Espacios a la Seguridad Ciudadana y el Desarrollo Humano,
October 2009. For 2009-2010, homicide rates for Belize, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, and Panama are
drawn from U.S. Department of State, Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs, Regional
Gang Initiative: Progress Status Report – CY2010, February 8, 2011. The 2009 homicide rate for Nicaragua is from
police statistics obtained by CRS from U.S. State Department officials. The 2009 homicide rate for Costa Rica is
from Programa Estado de la Nación, Informe Estado de la Nación en Desarrollo Humano Sostenible XVI, 2010. Data
for Mexico are from Mexico’s National System of Public Security.

10 For information on drug trafficking-related violence in Mexico, see CRS Report R41576, Mexico’s Drug Trafficking
Organizations: Source and Scope of the Rising Violence, by June S. Beittel.
11 Since FY2008, Congress has provided $1.5 billion in counterdrug and anti-crime assistance to Mexico under the
Mérida Initiative and $260 million to Central America through Mérida and CARSI. For historical information, see CRS
Report R40135, Mérida Initiative for Mexico and Central America: Funding and Policy Issues, by Clare Ribando
Seelke; and CRS Report R41215, Latin America and the Caribbean: Illicit Drug Trafficking and U.S. Counterdrug
Programs, coordinated by Clare Ribando Seelke.
12 Michael Shifter, “Central America’s Security Predicament,” Current History, February 1, 2011.
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Figure 2. Crime Victimization Rates in Mexico and Central America
Percentage of People Surveyed That Reported Being Victims of Crime in the Preceding 12 Months
Source: Americas Barometer survey data from 2010 by the Latin American Public Opinion Project of Vanderbilt
University.
Underlying Societal Conditions
The social fabric in many Central American countries has been tattered by persistent poverty,
inequality, and unemployment, with few opportunities available for growing youth populations
aside from emigration, often illegal.13 Except for Costa Rica and Panama, the countries of Central
America are generally low-income countries with low levels of human development (see the
Appendix). Studies have shown that high levels of income inequality are often stronger
predictors of high violent crime rates than poverty rates alone.14 For the most part, Central
American countries are not only impoverished, but highly unequal societies, with income
inequality exacerbated by the social exclusion of ethnic minorities and gender discrimination. The
linkage between inequality and high crime rates holds true in Central America except for the case
of El Salvador, a country with relatively low inequality but high crime rates.15 Poverty and
inequality have been reinforced by the lack of social mobility and persistent unemployment and
underemployment in many countries. With limited opportunities at home, roughly a quarter of

13 According to figures from the U.S. Department of Homeland Security (DHS), El Salvador, Guatemala, and Honduras
follow Mexico as the primary source countries for unauthorized (illegal) immigration to the United States. Michael
Hoefer, Nancy Rytina, and Bryan C. Baker, Estimates of the Unauthorized Immigrant Population Residing in the
United States: January 2010, DHS Office of Immigration Statistics, February 2011.
14 Pablo Fajnzylber, Daniel Lederman, and Norman Loayza, “Inequality and Violent Crime,” Journal of Law and
Economics, August 2001.
15 U.N. Development Program (UNDP), Informe Sobre Desarrollo Humano Para América Central 2009-2010: Abrir
Espacios a la Seguridad Ciudadana y el Desarrollo Humano, October 2009.
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Salvadorans now live abroad, leading analysts to assert that people have become one of the
country’s primary exports.16 El Salvador, Guatemala, and Honduras, which have large
percentages of their populations living in the United States, have reportedly suffered more from
the negative effects of emigration (such as family disintegration and deportations) than other
countries.17
With the exceptions of Belize and Costa Rica, Central American countries have also had a long
history of armed conflicts and/or dictatorships. A legacy of conflict and authoritarian rule has
inhibited the development of democratic institutions and respect for the rule of law in many
countries. Protracted armed conflicts also resulted in the widespread proliferation of illicit
firearms in the region, as well as a cultural tendency to resort to violence as a means of settling
disputes.18 Recent research details how illicit networks that smuggled arms and other supplies to
both sides involved in the armed conflict in El Salvador have been converted into transnational
criminal networks that smuggle drugs, people, illicit proceeds, weapons, and other stolen goods.19
In addition, some former combatants in El Salvador and Guatemala have put the skills they
acquired during their countries’ armed conflicts to use in the service of criminal groups, as the
end of civil conflicts there coincided with the emergence of drug trafficking in the region.20
Structural Weaknesses in Governance
In recent years, much has been written about the governance problems that have made many
Central American countries susceptible to the influence of drug traffickers and other criminal
elements and unable to guarantee citizen security, a basic function of any government. To begin
with, many governments do not have operational control over their borders and territories. As an
example, the Mexico-Guatemalan border is 600 miles long and has only eight formal
checkpoints.21 This is partially a result of regional police and military forces being generally
undermanned and/or ill-equipped to establish an effective presence in remote regions or to
challenge well-armed criminal groups.22 Resource constraints in the security sector have persisted
over time as governments have failed to increase taxes on businesses or wealthy individuals that
have tended to rely on private security firms to ensure their safety and security. One study
estimates that the number of authorized private security personnel in Central America may exceed
234,000, dwarfing the total number of police in the region.23

16 Sarah Gammage, “Exporting People and Recruiting Remittances: A Development Strategy for El Salvador?” Latin
American Perspectives , vol. 33, no. 6 (2006).
17 UNDP, October 2009, op. cit.
18 Facultad Latinoamericana de Ciencias Sociales (FLACSO), Armas Pequeñas y Livianas: Amenaza a la Seguridad
Hemisférica, 2007.
19 Douglas Farah, Organized Crime in El Salvador: the Homegrown and Transnational Dimensions, Woodrow Wilson
Center for Scholars Latin America Program, Working Paper Series on Organized Crime in Central America, February
2011.
20 Ibid.; Hal Brands, Crime, Violence, and the Crisis in Guatemala: A Case Study in the Erosion of the State, Strategic
Studies Institute, May 2010.
21 Embassy of Mexico, Toward a Secure and Prosperous Southern Border, October 2010.
22 In Guatemala, for example, former President Oscar Berger reduced the size and budget of the military by 50% more
than was required by the 1996 Peace Accords (to roughly 15,500 soldiers and 0.33% of GDP). That reform has since
been partially reversed by the Colom Administration, which aims to have some 20,000 soldiers in the Guatemalan
military. CRS interview with Guatemalan military official, January 20, 2011.
23 Otto Argueta, Private Security in Guatemala: the Pathway to its Proliferation, German Institute of Global Affairs
(continued…)
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Resource constraints aside, there have also been serious concerns about corruption in the police,
prisons, and judicial systems in Central America.24 This corruption has occurred partially as a
result of incomplete institutional reforms implemented after armed conflicts ended in several
countries in the 1990s.25 With crime victimization rates on the rise and impunity rates averaging
roughly 90%,26 people have low levels of trust in law enforcement, which has in turn increased
support for government initiatives aimed at increasing the role of the military in public security.
Survey data have shown that those who have been victims of crime or who perceive that crime is
increasing in their countries express less support for the political system and the rule of law than
other citizens, including less support for the idea that police should always obey the law.27 In
extreme cases, people in some Central American countries have taken justice into their own hands
by carrying out vigilante killings of those suspected of committing crimes.
Criminal Threats
Drug Trafficking Organizations
Since the mid-1990s, the primary pathway for illegal drugs, including Andean cocaine, entering
the United States has been through Mexico (see Figure 3). As recently as 2007, however, only a
small amount of cocaine that passed through Mexico first transited through Central America.
Currently, 95% of all cocaine entering the United States flows through Mexico or its territorial
waters, with 60% of that cocaine having first transited through Central America.28 The use of
Central America as a transshipment zone has continued to grow as traffickers have used overland
smuggling, littoral maritime trafficking, and short-distance aerial trafficking rather than longrange maritime or aerial trafficking to transport cocaine from South America to Mexico.29 A large
but unknown proportion of opiates, as well as foreign-produced marijuana and
methamphetamine, some of which is now locally produced, also flows through the same
pathways. This overwhelming use of the Central America-Mexico corridor as a transit zone
represents a major shift in trafficking routes. In the 1980s and early 1990s, for example, drugs
primarily transited through the Caribbean into South Florida.

(…continued)
and Area Studies, September 2010.
24 According to Transparency International’s 2010 Corruption Perception Index (CPI), the Central American countries
that are perceived to be the most corrupt are Honduras, Nicaragua, and Guatemala, while Costa Rica is viewed as least
corrupt. (Belize is not ranked.) For recent examples of corruption, see country entries in U.S. Department of State,
Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs, International Narcotics Control Strategy Report
(INCSR), March 3, 2011, http://www.state.gov/p/inl/rls/nrcrpt/2011/index.htm.
25 On police reform, see Washington Office on Latin America (WOLA), Protect and Serve? The Status of Police
Reform in Central America, June 2009. On the judicial sector, see Due Process of Law Foundation, Evaluation of
Judicial Corruption in Central America and Panama and Mechanisms to Combat It, 2007.
26 UNDP, October 2009, op. cit., p. 235.
27 Mitchell A. Seligson and Amy Erica Smith, eds., The Political Culture of Democracy, 2010: Democratic
Consolidation in the Americas in Hard Times, Vanderbilt University Latin American Public Opinion Project,
December 2010.
28 INCSR, March 2011, op. cit.
29 Stephen Meiners, “Central America: An Emerging Role in the Drug Trade,” STRATFOR, March 28, 2009.
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Figure 3. Central American Drug Trafficking Routes
Source: STRATFOR, February 25, 2011, http://www.stratfor.com.
Stepped-up enforcement efforts in Mexico and instability in certain Central American countries
have also led traffickers to use Central America, particularly Guatemala and Honduras, as
transshipment points for Andean cocaine bound for the United States. Following the June 2009
ouster of President Manuel Zelaya, for example, drug flights into Honduras reportedly
skyrocketed.30 In September 2010, President Obama identified every Central American country
except for Belize and El Salvador as a major drug transit country, with Costa Rica, Honduras, and
Nicaragua making their first appearance on the list.31

30 James Bosworth, Honduras: Organized Crime Gaining Amid Political Crisis, Woodrow Wilson Center for Scholars
Latin America Program, Working Paper Series on Organized Crime in Central America, February 2011.
31 Beginning in 1986 (P.L. 99-570), Congress introduced an annual procedure to withhold certain types of bilateral
foreign assistance, not including counternarcotics assistance, to major drug-producing and major drug transit countries
worldwide, commonly termed the “drug majors.” The President is required annually to issue a presidential
determination to identify which countries are to be included in the list of drug majors for the following fiscal year. For
FY2011, President Barack Obama identified 20 drug majors, including Costa Rica, Guatemala, Honduras, Nicaragua,
and Panama. The drug majors are then evaluated on the basis of their effort to combat drugs and cooperate with the
U.S. government on drug policy issues. The President must accordingly “certify” to Congress that drug majors have
either “cooperated fully” or have “failed demonstrably” in U.S. and international counternarcotics efforts. President
Obama certified all five Central American countries on the list. Barack Obama, Presidential Determination No. 2009-
30, “Memorandum to the Secretary of State: Major Drug Transit or Major Illicit Drug Producing Countries for Fiscal
Year 2011,” September 16, 2010.
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In the past, Mexican and Colombian drug trafficking organizations (DTOs) tended to contract
local drug trafficking groups in Central America, sometimes referred to as transportistas, to
transport drugs through that region. Recently, drug transshipment activities have increasingly
been taken over, often after violent struggles, by Mexican drug traffickers from the Sinaloa DTO
and the Zetas, a rival DTO started by former Mexican military officers who, until recently, served
as the paramilitary wing of the Gulf DTO.32 Mexican DTOs have been most active in Guatemala,
where they are battling each other and family-based Guatemalan DTOs for control over lucrative
drug smuggling routes. Officials estimate that between 40% and 60% of Guatemalan territory
may now be under the effective control of drug traffickers.33 In December 2010, Guatemalan
President Alvaro Colom declared a “state of siege” in the Alto Verapaz region of his country,
invoking martial law in an attempt to wrest control of that state from the Zetas.34 Mexican DTOs
have also begun to pay transportistas and gangs who distribute drugs or serve as enforcers (or hit
men) in product, which has increased drug consumption in many countries and sparked disputes
between local groups over control of domestic drug markets.35
Gangs36
In recent years, Central American governments, the media, and some analysts have attributed,
sometimes erroneously, a significant proportion of violent crime in the region to transnational
youth gangs, or maras, many of which have ties to the United States. The major gangs operating
in Central America with ties to the United States are the “18th Street” gang (also known as M-18)
and its main rival, the Mara Salvatrucha (MS-13).37 The 18th Street gang was formed by Mexican
youth in the Rampart section of Los Angeles in the 1960s who were not accepted into existing
Hispanic gangs. MS-13 was created during the 1980s by Salvadorans in Los Angeles who had
fled the country’s civil conflict. Both gangs later expanded their operations to Central America.
This process accelerated after the United States began deporting illegal immigrants, many with
criminal convictions, back to the region after the passage of the Illegal Immigrant Reform and
Immigrant Responsibility Act (IIRIRA) of 1996.38
Estimates of the overall number of gang members in Central America vary widely, but the U.S.
Southern Command has placed that figure at around 70,000, a figure also cited by the United
Nations. The gang problem is most severe in Honduras, Guatemala, and El Salvador. Estimates of
Central American gang membership by country also vary considerably, but the U.N. Office on
Drugs and Crime (UNODC) has cited country membership totals of some 36,000 in Honduras,
14,000 in Guatemala, and 10,500 in El Salvador. These figures are compared to 4,500 in

32 Dudley, May 2010, op. cit.
33 The lower estimate is cited in Brands, May 2010, op. cit. The upper estimate is from “Drug Traffickers Have
Stranglehold on Guatemala Says Top Prosecutor,” El País, February 23, 2011.
34 The “state of siege,” which lasted for two months, reportedly resulted in the seizure of $1.2 million worth of illicit
goods and the arrests of 25 suspects. Nicholas Casey, “Mexican Drug War Spills to Neighbor,” Wall Street Journal,
February 26, 2011.
35 Dudley, May 2010, op. cit.
36 This section is drawn from CRS Report RL34112, Gangs in Central America, by Clare Ribando Seelke.
37 For the history and evolution of these gangs, see Tom Diaz, No Boundaries: Transnational Latino Gangs and
American Law Enforcement, Ann Arbor, M.I.: University of Michigan Press, 2009.
38 IRIRA expanded the categories of illegal immigrants subject to deportation and made it more difficult for immigrants
to get relief from removal.
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Nicaragua, 2,660 in Costa Rica, and 1,385 in Panama.39 Nicaragua has a significant number of
local gangs, often referred to as pandillas, but does not have large numbers of MS-13 or M-18
members.
MS-13 and M-18 began as loosely structured street gangs, but there is evidence that both gangs
have expanded geographically, become more organized, and expanded the range of their criminal
activities. As happened in the United States, gang leaders in Central America have used prisons to
recruit new members and to increase the discipline and cohesion among their existing ranks. By
2008, Salvadoran police had found evidence suggesting that some MS-13 leaders jailed in El
Salvador were ordering retaliatory assassinations of individuals in Northern Virginia, as well as
designing plans to unify their clicas (cliques) with those in the United States.40 Central American
officials have blamed gangs for a large percentage of homicides committed in recent years,
particularly in El Salvador and Honduras, but some analysts assert that those claims may be
exaggerated.41 The actual percentage of homicides that can be attributed to gangs in Central
America remains controversial, but analysts agree that the gangs have increasingly become
involved in extortion, kidnapping, human trafficking, and drug, auto, and weapons smuggling.
Gangs have extorted millions of dollars from residents, bus drivers, and businesses in cities
throughout the region. Failure to pay often results in harassment or violence by gang members,
with at least 170 Guatemalan bus drivers and fare collectors killed by gangs in 2010 alone.42 The
Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) has also documented increasing numbers of cases of
extortion schemes carried out by gangs in El Salvador against Salvadorans living in the United
States.43
Some studies maintain that ties between Central American gangs and organized criminal groups
have increased, while others downplay the connection. Regional and U.S. authorities have
confirmed increasing gang involvement in drug trafficking, although mostly on a local level. MS13 members are reportedly being contracted on an ad hoc basis by Mexico’s warring DTOs to
carry out revenge killings. Some analysts assert that the relationship between DTOs and gangs
appears to be most developed in El Salvador and, to a lesser extent, in Honduras, with few DTOgang connections in Costa Rica, Guatemala, Nicaragua, or Panama.44
Other Criminal Organizations
Much less information is publicly available about what analysts have termed “other criminal
organizations” than about drug trafficking organizations or gangs operating in the region.
Criminal organizations included in this catchall category may be involved in a wide variety of
illicit activities, including, but not limited to, arms trafficking, alien smuggling, human

39 Testimony of General Bantz J. Craddock, Commander, U.S. Southern Command, before the Senate Armed Services
Committee, March 15, 2005; United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC), Crime and Development in
Central America: Caught in the Crossfire, May 2007. These estimates are still widely cited.
40 U.S. Department of State, Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs, Regional Gang Initiative:
Assessments and Plan of Action, July 1, 2008.
41 UNODC, May 2007, op. cit.
42 “Guatemala: Desde las Cárceles los Pandilleros Continúan Sembrando el Terror,” Agence France Presse, January 6,
2011.
43 U.S. Department of State, Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs, Regional Gang Initiative:
Progress Status Report – CY2010, Feb. 8, 2010.
44 Dudley, May 2010, op. cit.
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trafficking, and money laundering. Some organizations specialize in one type of crime, such as
human trafficking, while other enterprises engage in a range of criminal activities. Although most
of the income-generating activities of these criminal organizations are illicit, some groups receive
revenue through ties to legitimate businesses as well.
Some criminal enterprises active in Central America focus only on a certain neighborhood, city,
or perhaps region in one country, while others, often referred to as “organized crime,”45 possess
the capital, manpower, and networks required to run sophisticated enterprises and to penetrate
state institutions at high levels. The more organized criminal groups in Central America include
both domestically based and transnational groups. In Guatemala, for example, much has been
written on the ongoing influence and illicit activities of domestic criminal organizations, often
referred to as “hidden powers,” whose membership includes members of the country’s elite,
including current and former politicians and military officials.46 While the dominant transnational
criminal organization may vary from country to country, certain transnational criminal groups
appear to be active throughout the region.
Efforts Within Central America
Confronting the increasing threat posed by both transnational and domestic criminal
organizations has become a central concern of governments throughout Central America. Until
recently, governments in the “northern triangle” countries of Central America have tended to
adopt more aggressive law enforcement approaches than the other Central American countries.
These policies have included deploying military forces to help police perform public security
functions and enacting tough anti-gang laws (in El Salvador and Honduras), which have led to
large roundups of suspected gang members. In general, such policies have failed to stave off
rising crime rates in the region and have had several negative unintended consequences, including
severe prison overcrowding. As a result, many experts have urged governments to move away
from “enforcement-only” strategies toward more holistic approaches to addressing crime and
violence.47 Just as broad-based anti-crime efforts in particular countries need to be intensified, so
too do regional security efforts coordinated by the Central American Integration System (SICA).48
SICA is in the process of revising its proposal for a regional security plan for Central America,
which it will present to the United States and other international donors at a conference scheduled
to be held in Guatemala in June 2011.

45 The definition of what constitutes “organized criminal organizations” varies significantly from country to country.
For example, the Mexican government refers to DTOs as organized crime, whereas the U.S. government has
historically considered drug trafficking and organized crime as distinct for programmatic purposes. Similarly, the
Salvadoran government considers gangs as transnational organized crime, while the Nicaraguan government seems to
view gangs as a local problem to be addressed primarily by youth crime prevention programs. For a discussion of the
various definitions of organized crime in the United States, see CRS Report R41547, Organized Crime: An Evolving
Challenge for U.S. Law Enforcement, by Jerome P. Bjelopera and Kristin M. Finklea; and CRS Report R40525,
Organized Crime in the United States: Trends and Issues for Congress, by Kristin M. Finklea.
46 See, for example, Susan C. Peacock and Adrana Beltrán, Hidden Powers in Post-Conflict Guatemala, WOLA,
September 2003; Brands, May 2010, op. cit.
47 Holistic approaches to addressing gang-related violence may include prevention programs for at-risk youth,
interventions to encourage youth to leave gangs, and the creation of municipal alliances against crime and violence.
48 The Central American Integration System (SICA), a regional organization with a Secretariat in El Salvador, is
composed of the governments of Belize, Costa Rica, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, and Panama. The Security
Commission was created in 1995 to develop and carry out regional security efforts.
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Law Enforcement Approaches
Following the end of armed conflicts and dictatorships in Central America in the 1990s, most
countries made significant progress in subordinating military forces to civilian control and in
reducing the size of military budgets and personnel. They made less progress, however, in
defining proper military-police roles and relationships, particularly as they relate to dealing with
threats to public security.49 Despite, or perhaps because of, that lack of definition, El Salvador,
Guatemala, and Honduras have deployed thousands of troops to help their often underpaid and
poorly equipped police forces carry out public security functions, without clearly defining when
those deployments might end. Salvadoran military officials estimate that approximately 8,000
troops are involved in border security efforts, joint patrols with police in high-crime areas, and
patrolling the country’s prisons. Guatemalan military officials maintain that fewer than 10% of
the country’s 9,000 soldiers currently perform traditional military functions.50 The Honduran
government has recently sent troops to help patrol its major urban centers. This trend has led
many human rights groups to raise concerns about the “re-militarization” of some Central
American countries and to predict an increase in human rights abuses committed by military
personnel in the region who are ill-trained to perform police work (as has occurred in Mexico).51
Evidence also indicates that military involvement in public security functions has not reduced
crime rates significantly.
In the early 2000s, governments in the northern triangle countries also adopted mano dura
(strong-handed) anti-gang policies in response to popular demands and media pressure for them
to “do something” about an escalation in gang-related crime. Mano dura approaches typically
involve incarcerating large numbers of youth (often those with visible tattoos) for illicit
association, and increasing sentences for gang membership and gang-related crimes. Early public
reactions to the tough anti-gang reforms enacted in El Salvador and Honduras were extremely
positive, supported by media coverage demonizing the activities of tattooed youth gang members,
but the long-term effects of the policies on gangs and crime have been largely disappointing.
Most youth arrested under mano dura provisions were subsequently released for lack of evidence
that they committed any crime. Some youth who were wrongly arrested for gang involvement
were recruited into the gang life while in prison. Finally, in response to mano dura policies, gangs
have changed their behavior to avoid detection.
Aggressive roundups of criminal suspects have overwhelmed prisons in Central America, which
are in desperate need of reform. Prison conditions in the region are generally harsh, with severe
overcrowding, inadequate sanitation, and staffing shortages. In recent years, facilities that were
already teeming with inmates have been filled beyond their capacities with thousands of
suspected gang members, many of whom have yet to be convicted of any crimes.

49 Richard L. Millett and Orlando J. Perez, “New Threats and Old Dilemmas: Central America’s Armed Forces in the
21st Century,” Journal of Political and Military Sociology, vol. 33, no. 1 (Summer 2005).
50 CRS interview with Salvadoran military official, January 17, 2011; CRS interview with Guatemalan military official,
January 20, 2011. See also “Military Given Indefinite Role in Combating Organized Crime,” Latin American Regional
Report: Caribbean & Central America, February 2011.
51 See, for example, relevant sections of George Withers, Lucila Santos, and Adam Isaacson, Preach What you
Practice: the Separation of Military and Police Roles in the Americas, WOLA, November 2010.
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In addition to prison reform, large-scale institutional reforms to improve the investigative
capacity of police and the conviction rates secured by public prosecutors’ offices are still needed
in many Central American countries; however, such reforms have generally not been undertaken
because of limited funding and political will to do so. The U.S. government has urged
governments to employ “intelligence-led policing” and urged legislatures in the region to give
police and prosecutors new tools to help them build successful cases, including the ability to use
wiretaps to gather evidence. In 2010, the Guatemalan government had some success in using
wiretaps to arrest and prosecute gangs involved in extorting and murdering public transit
workers.52 Some countries are also in the process of implementing laws that would enable assets
seized from criminal organizations to fund law enforcement entities. Improving trust,
information-sharing, and coordination between police and prosecutors is another important
component of the reform process. Building that trust will require proper recruiting, vetting, and
training of police and prosecutors, as well as robust systems of internal and external controls in
both institutions to detect and punish corruption.53
The International Commission against Impunity in Guatemala (CICIG) is a new approach to law
enforcement in the region. Recognizing that its judicial system was too weak and corrupt to
handle criminal prosecutions on its own, Guatemala agreed to the creation of an international
entity capable of supporting investigative and prosecutorial efforts within the country. Other
Central American nations are now considering the model as a result of its considerable success
(see the text box below, “The International Commission Against Impunity in Guatemala: A
Regional Model?”).

52 INCSR, March 2011, op. cit.; U.S. Department of State, Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement
Affairs, Regional Gang Initiative: Progress Status Report – CY2010, February 8, 2010. El Salvador, Guatemala,
Panama, and Nicaragua have wiretapping laws in place.
53 For detailed information on the status of police reform in Central America and additional reforms that need to be
undertaken in the region, see WOLA, Protect and Serve? The Status of Police Reform in Central America, June 2009,
http://www.wola.org/publications/protect_and_serve_the_status_of_police_reform_in_central_america.
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The International Commission Against Impunity in Guatemala:
A Regional Model?
In August 2007, the Guatemalan Congress ratified an agreement with the United Nations to establish a commission to
support Guatemalan institutions in the identification, investigation, and prosecution of illegal security groups and
clandestine organizations, some of which have been tied, directly or indirectly, to the Guatemalan state. Inaugurated
in January 2008, the International Commission against Impunity in Guatemala (CICIG) is a unique hybrid body that
operates completely within the Guatemalan legal system, includes both international and local staff, and has a $20
million annual budget funded entirely through international donations. In addition to assisting in investigative and
prosecutorial actions, CICIG undertakes efforts to build capacity within justice sector institutions and recommends
public policies and institutional reforms. CICIG’s mandate, which was originally for two years, has been extended
twice and is now scheduled to end in September 2013.54
In its first three years, CICIG has produced considerable results. Commission-supported investigations into
corruption and the infiltration of organized crime in state institutions have contributed to the dismissal of some 1,700
police officers and several senior prosecutors. Likewise, a number of former high-level officials, including an expresident, have been charged with corruption and are facing trials.55 In addition, CICIG has helped prevent a number
of individuals with significant ties to corruption and/or organized crime from being appointed to senior positions in
the Guatemalan state, including the attorney general’s office and three seats on the supreme court. Moreover, the
Guatemalan government has approved CICIG-recommended legislative reforms, such as changes to an arms and
munitions law, an organized crime law, and the code of criminal procedure.56 Proponents of CICIG argue that
perhaps its greatest achievement has been to demonstrate to the public that Guatemala’s high impunity rates are not
inevitable, and the criminal justice system can be made to work, even against powerful individuals who have long been
considered “untouchable.”57 At the same time, some analysts have questioned whether Guatemalan institutions are
too dependent on CICIG and how much capacity will remain once the commission’s mandate ends.58
Given the success of CICIG, the presidents of El Salvador and Honduras have indicated interest in setting up similar
commissions in their countries or a regional commission to combat organized crime in the entire northern triangle.
Although most analysts agree that both countries would benefit from technical assistance in conducting investigations
and prosecutions, there is disagreement concerning what form of assistance would be most beneficial. Some have
suggested that a regional commission would be best, given the regional nature of organized crime. 59 Others argue
that separate commissions may be more useful since security conditions and institutional capacity vary between the
countries.60 It may be difficult to establish any form of commission, however, as countries would need to look to
international donors for funding, and many citizens and legislators are opposed to the idea of ceding sovereignty to an
international body.
Prevention
In the past few years, Central American leaders, including those from the northern triangle
countries, appear to have moved, at least on a rhetorical level, toward more comprehensive
approaches to dealing with gangs and crime. In mid-December 2007, then-Salvadoran President

54 Julia Shünemann, ‘Looking the Monster in the Face’: The International Commission against Impunity in Guatemala
and the ‘Rule of Law-builders Contract,’ Initiative for Peacebuilding (IFP) and Fundación para las Relaciones
Internacionales y el Diálogo Exterior (FRIDE), October 2010; Frank Bajak and Juan Carlos Llorca, “U.N.-backed
Investigators Shake up Guatemala,” Associated Press, November 14, 2010; CRS interview with CICIG official,
January 20, 2011.
55 Bajak and Llorca, November 2010, op. cit.
56 Comisión Internacional Contra la Impunidad en Guatemala (CICIG), Tercer Año de Labores, September 2010.
57 Morris Panner and Adriana Beltrán, “Battling Organized Crime in Guatemala,” Americas Quarterly, Fall 2010.
58 “Guatemala: CICIG Takes Stock,” Latin American Weekly Report, October 21, 2010; Shünemann, October 2010, op.
cit.
59 CRS interview with analysts at the Fundación Salvadoreña para el Desarrollo Económico y Social (FUSADES),
January 18, 2010.
60 CRS interview with CICIG official, January 20, 2011.
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Tony Saca opened a summit of the Central America Integration System (SICA) by stating that the
gang problem had shown the importance of coordinated anti-crime efforts, with the most
important element of those efforts being prevention. All of the Central American countries have
created institutional bodies to design and coordinate crime prevention strategies and have units
within their national police forces engaged in prevention efforts. Some governments, with support
from the U.N. Development Program (UNDP) and other donors, have also begun to encourage
municipalities to develop crime prevention plans. In general, however, government-sponsored
prevention programs have tended, with some exceptions (such as Nicaragua’s national youth
crime prevention strategy), to be small-scale, ad hoc, and underfunded. Governments have been
even less involved in sponsoring rehabilitation programs for individuals seeking to leave gangs,
with most reintegration programs funded by church groups or nongovernmental organizations
(NGOs).
Central American government officials have generally cited budgetary limitations and competing
concerns as major factors limiting their ability to implement more extensive prevention and
rehabilitation programs. This may be changing, however, as the government of Mauricio Funes in
El Salvador has increased funding for prevention programs to roughly 14% of the Ministry of
Security’s budget (from a historic average of just over 1%).61 Experts have long argued that it is
important for governments to offer educational and job opportunities to youth who are willing to
leave gangs before they are tempted to join more sophisticated criminal organizations. It is also
critical, they argue, for intervention efforts to focus on strengthening families of at-risk youth.62
Counterdrug Efforts
Despite having limited technology and relatively small interdiction budgets, many countries have
markedly increased their seizures of drugs and illicit funds over the past few years, with
Nicaragua showing especially high seizure rates. In 2010, Panama, Nicaragua, and Costa Rica
seized more cocaine than Mexico (see Table 2). Although large quantities of cocaine do not tend
to flow through El Salvador, and the country has registered only small cocaine seizures in recent
years, Salvadoran police officials seized some $20 million worth of illicit currency in 2010.63
Even with these increasing seizure rates, however, obstacles to more effective counterdrug efforts
are numerous and have not changed significantly over time.64 Some of those obstacles include a
lack of funding and equipment for security forces engaged in interdiction efforts, an inability to
sustain programs started with U.S. assistance, limited political support in some countries, and
corruption.65 For example, Costa Rica, which has no military, has only three boats with no

61 CRS interview with officials from El Salvador’s National Civilian Police, December 7, 2010.
62 Bernardo Kliksberg, Mitos y Realidades Sobre la Criminalidad en America Latina (Guatemala City: F & G Editores,
2007).
63 INCSR, March 2011, op. cit.
64 A 1994 report by what was then known as the U.S. General Accounting Office found that “although all of the Central
American countries have drug control efforts underway, no country possesses the technical, financial or human
resources necessary to run an efficient drug interdiction program … [and that] corruption also limits the effectiveness of
Central American governments’ narcotics control efforts.” U.S. General Accounting Office, Interdiction Efforts in
Central America Have Had Little Impact on the Flow of Drugs, GAO/NSIAD- 94-233, August 1994,
http://www.fas.org/irp/gao/nsi94233.htm.
65 U.S. Government Accountability Office (GAO), Cooperation with Many Major Drug Transit Countries Has
Improved, but Better Performance Reporting and Sustainability Plans Are Needed, GAO-08-784, July 2008,
http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d08784.pdf.
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nighttime navigation capacity to patrol its coastline, and no helicopters, radars, or planes for
police engaged in interdiction efforts.66 In Guatemala, high-level official corruption has
exacerbated the country’s resource constraints and limited political will. Two former heads of the
country’s national police are currently facing drug trafficking and conspiracy charges.67
Table 2. Estimated Cocaine Seizures in 2010, by Country
(in metric tons)
Belize
Costa
Rica
El
Salvador Guatemala Honduras Nicaragua Panama Mexico
2.6 14.8 0.1 1.4 9.0 17.5 49.5 9.4
Source: U.S. Department of State, Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs, International
Narcotics Control Strategy Report (INCSR), March 3, 2011.
Regional Security Efforts
Some analysts maintain that the increasing threat posed by transnational organized crime has led
to greater security cooperation among Central American countries; others disagree, maintaining
that many obstacles to regional efforts remain.68 While most governments appear to agree on a
theoretical level that they need to work together on security issues and to approach donors jointly,
they continue to differ among themselves as to the biggest threats facing the region and the best
ways to combat those threats. The need to cooperate on shared security challenges has also
sometimes been overshadowed by unrelated disputes among the countries, including the recent
Costa Rica-Nicaragua border dispute. Even when the will to collaborate as a region has existed,
political instability in particular countries, such as the June 2009 ouster of the president of
Honduras, has inhibited regional efforts.
Central American governments have demonstrated differing levels of political will to address
crime and tackle corruption, and varying degrees of willingness to collaborate with the United
States, a major donor in the region. For example, according to a top SICA official, the Central
American governments together spend a total of roughly $6.5 billion a year on security.69 That
aggregate figure masks significant variance among the countries in terms of the amount of
funding budgeted for criminal justice and law enforcement ministries. While funds dedicated to
police and public security have reportedly increased under the current administrations in Costa
Rica and El Salvador, the Guatemalan government has cut its justice and law enforcement
budgets in 2009 and 2010 to dedicate more funding to social programs.70 Varying degrees of
cooperation exist between Central American governments and the U.S. government. For example,
although cooperation continues between the Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) and the
Nicaraguan Navy on interdiction, the Nicaraguan government has disbanded the vetted anti-drug

66 CRS correspondence with Embassy of Costa Rica official, March 3, 2011.
67 INCSR, March 2011, op. cit.
68 “Central America: Prospects for a new U.S.-Backed Regional Scheme,” Latin American Security and Strategic
Review, February 2011. 69 CRS phone interview with SICA official, March 3, 2011.
70 CRS interview with State Department official, February 25, 2011. On Guatemala, see INCSR, March 2011, op. cit.
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police unit trained by DEA and refused to sign bilateral counternarcotics agreements with the
United States in fiscal years 2009 and 2010.71
Central American leaders and officials have regularly met over the past few years, often
accompanied by their U.S. and Mexican counterparts, to discuss ways to better coordinate
security efforts and information sharing on gang members and other criminal groups. Most of the
regional security meetings have been organized by the Security Commission of SICA. The
leaders of the SICA member states and the president-elect of Mexico began developing a regional
security strategy in October 2006, which was subsequently adopted at a summit held in August
2007.72 The strategy identified eight threats to regional security, including organized crime, drug
trafficking, deportees with criminal records, gangs, homicide, small arms trafficking, terrorism,
and corruption. In 2008, SICA estimated that the costs to implement its regional security plan
could exceed $953 million, including $60 million for anti-gang efforts.73
Until recently, most regional security cooperation has occurred on a declarative, rather than an
operational, level. SICA is reportedly trying to change that tendency by asking donors to establish
a trust fund within the Inter-American Development Bank (IDB) that would be used to fund
concrete projects in the region that align with its revised security plan. The scope of SICA’s
proposed plan has been revised to focus only on efforts in Central America (not Mexico), to
prioritize fewer initiatives, and to address prevention, prison reform, and reinsertion/rehabilitation
of criminals. It is now estimated to cost between $400 million and $500 million.74 SICA is
planning to convene a donors’ conference in June 2011 to seek bilateral and multilateral support
for the plan. SICA is seeking new financial support over and above current donor assistance
levels to the region, which totaled approximately $1.5 billion in committed or dispersed funds
between FY2008 and FY2010.75 It remains to be seen whether the United States and other
bilateral and multilateral donors will be willing to dedicate new funding to Central America
and/or to refocus their existing efforts to align better with Central America’s top priorities. Some
observers question whether SICA has the institutional capacity to manage projects across the
Central American region.76
U.S. Policy
U.S. security policy in the Western Hemisphere has changed considerably in recent years. In the
aftermath of the Cold War, preventing narcotics from reaching the United States became the
primary focus of U.S. security efforts in the hemisphere. In an attempt to reduce the supply of
illicit drugs, the bulk of U.S. security assistance was concentrated in Colombia and the other
cocaine-producing nations of the Andean region of South America. The United States provided
some support for counternarcotics and other security efforts elsewhere in the hemisphere—
including a major interdiction effort in Central America in the early 1990s—but the funding

71 INCSR, March 2011, op. cit.
72 A copy of that version of the strategy is available at http://www.state.gov/p/wha/rls/93586.htm.
73 SICA General Secretariat, Fifth Meeting of the Working Group for Drafting Proposals to Finance Central American
Security, May 13-14, 2008.
74 CRS phone interview with SICA official, March 3, 2011.
75 Forthcoming study by WOLA and the Inter-American Development Bank, presented at a “Friends of Central
America” meeting, February 14, 2011.
76 Villiers Negroponte, Spring 2010, op. cit.
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levels were comparatively low. Although U.S.-led efforts have contributed to temporary successes
in particular countries or sub-regions, they have done little to change the overall availability of
illicit drugs in the United States, as traffickers have altered their cultivation patterns, production
techniques, and trafficking routes and methods in order to avoid detection. These mixed results,
along with rising levels of crime and violence throughout the hemisphere, have led policymakers
to move toward a more comprehensive approach to security issues.77
While largely maintaining previous narcotics supply reduction efforts, U.S. policy now places
increased emphasis on coordinating efforts throughout the hemisphere and strengthening the
capacities of partner governments. The Obama Administration, which has made ensuring the
safety and security of all citizens one of the four overarching priorities of U.S. policy in Latin
America, has sought to develop collaborative partnerships with countries throughout the
hemisphere.78 These partnerships have taken the form of bilateral security cooperation with
countries like Colombia and Mexico, as well as regional programs such as the Caribbean Basin
Security Initiative (CBSI) and the Central America Regional Security Initiative (CARSI).
According to the State Department, activities supported through these partnerships are designed
to be complementary and are developed in coordination with one another, drawing on lessons
learned from past U.S. initiatives. In addition to providing equipment, training, and technical
assistance to support immediate law enforcement and interdiction operations, these partnerships
seek to strengthen the capacities of governmental institutions to address security challenges and
the underlying economic and social conditions that contribute to them.79 In spite of these efforts,
some prominent Latin American leaders, including former presidents of Brazil, Colombia, and
Mexico, assert that U.S. counternarcotics policies will be largely ineffective until the United
States does more to reduce its domestic drug demand.80
Background on Assistance to Central America
Given the proximity of Central America, the United States has long been concerned about
potential security threats from the region and has provided Central American nations with
assistance to counter those threats. During the Cold War, the United States viewed links between
the Soviet Union and political movements in Central America as a potential threat to U.S.
strategic interests. To prevent Soviet allies from establishing political or military footholds in the
region, the United States heavily supported anti-communist forces, including the Salvadoran
government in its battle against the leftist insurgency of the Farabundo Martí National Liberation
Front (FMLN), and the contra forces seeking to overthrow the leftist government of the
Sandinista National Liberation Front (FSLN) in Nicaragua.81 Between 1979, when the Sandinistas
seized power in Nicaragua, and 1992, when peace accords were signed to end the civil war in El

77 For more information on the evolution of U.S. policies, see CRS Report R41215, Latin America and the Caribbean:
Illicit Drug Trafficking and U.S. Counterdrug Programs, coordinated by Clare Ribando Seelke. For information on
interdiction efforts in Central America in the early 1990s, see GAO, August 1994, op. cit.
78 Valenzuela testimony, February 2011, op. cit.
79 U.S. Department of State, “Hemispheric Security—An Integrated U.S. Government Approach,” January 25, 2011.
80 Latin American Commission on Drugs and Democracy, Drugs and Democracy: Towards a Paradigm Shift, February
2009, available in English at http://www.drogasedemocracia.org/Arquivos/livro_ingles_02.pdf.
81 U.S. Congress, Joint Economic Committee, The Caribbean Basin: Economic and Security Issues, committee print,
Central America: Continuing U.S. Concerns, study paper prepared by Nina M. Serafino of the Congressional Research
Service, 102nd Cong., 2nd sess., January 1993, S.Prt. 102-110 (Washington: GPO, 1993), pp. 173-178.
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Salvador, U.S. economic and military assistance to Central America averaged $1.3 billion
annually.82
Following the dissolution of the Soviet Union and the end of the civil wars in the region, U.S.
assistance to Central American nations declined substantially. Between FY1993 and FY2007,
total U.S. assistance to Central America averaged $413 million annually, roughly a third of what
had been provided in the previous 15 years.83 Likewise, the majority of the assistance provided
was directed toward economic and political development, as the United States sought to
encourage the spread of free-market economic policies and the consolidation of democratic
governance. Of the security-related assistance that the United States has provided to the region
since the end of the Cold War, a substantial portion has been dedicated to U.S. Agency for
International Development (USAID) rule of law programs, which have provided support for
justice sector reforms in several Central American nations since the 1980s.84 In El Salvador—
where institutional reforms have been the most extensive—USAID has supported the
establishment of informal justice centers that provide community-level mediation and dispute
resolution, and the transformation of the judicial process from a written, inquisitorial system to an
oral, accusatorial system, among other efforts. Although reforms such as these have strengthened
the rule of law in El Salvador and other Central American nations, progress has been uneven and
many justice sector institutions remain relatively weak, as noted above.85
Central America Regional Security Initiative
Formulation
The impetus for increased U.S.-Central American cooperation on security issues stemmed from a
trip by then-President George W. Bush to Central America and Mexico in March 2007. Concerns
over an increase in narcotics flows and the rapid escalation of crime and violence in the region
reportedly dominated the President’s conversations with his counterparts, as well as follow-on
consultations between U.S., Central American, and Mexican officials. To capitalize on the
emergence of a cohesive security dialogue among the seven nations of Central America and the
Mexican government’s willingness to address the issues of drug trafficking and organized crime,
the Bush Administration began to develop the framework for a new regional security partnership.
In October 2007, the Bush Administration requested funding for a security assistance package
designed to support Mexico and the countries of Central America in their fight against organized
crime, to improve communication among the various law enforcement agencies, and to support
the institutional reforms necessary to ensure the long-term enforcement of the rule of law and
protection of civil and human rights.86 This security assistance package was originally known as

82 Assistance peaked in 1985 at nearly $2.4 billion. Figures are in constant, 2009 dollars. U.S. Overseas Loans and
Grants, op. cit.
83 Ibid.
84 USAID initiated rule of law programs in El Salvador in 1984, in Costa Rica and Honduras in 1985, in Guatemala in
1986, and Panama in 1992. U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID), Bureau for Democracy, Conflict,
and Humanitarian Assistance, Office of Democracy and Governance, Achievements in Building and Maintaining the
Rule of Law, Occasional Papers Series, November 2002.
85 Ibid.
86 Testimony of Thomas A. Shannon Jr., Assistant Secretary of State for Western Hemisphere Affairs, and David T.
Johnson, Assistant Secretary of State for International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs, U.S. Department of
(continued…)
Central America Regional Security Initiative: Background and Policy Issues for Congress
Congressional Research Service 20
the Mérida Initiative, named after the location in Mexico where President Bush had met with
President Calderón. The Central America portion of Mérida was split into a separate Central
America Regional Security Initiative (CARSI) in FY2010. Officials from nearly every Central
American nation maintain that the region was not sufficiently involved in the formulation of
Mérida/CARSI, and that the initiative could be more responsive to host government priorities.87
As currently formulated, CARSI provides equipment, training, and technical assistance to build
the capacity of Central American institutions to counter criminal threats. In addition, CARSI
supports community-based programs designed to address underlying economic and social
conditions that leave communities vulnerable to those threats. The five primary goals of CARSI
are to:
1. create safe streets for the citizens of the region;
2. disrupt the movement of criminals and contraband within and among the nations
of Central America;
3. support the development of strong, capable, and accountable Central American
governments;
4. establish effective state presence and security in communities at risk; and
5. foster enhanced levels of security and rule of law coordination and cooperation
among the nations of the region.88
Funding from FY2008-FY201289
Between FY2008 and FY2010, $260 million was appropriated for the countries of Central
America under what was formerly known as the Mérida Initiative-Central America and is now
known as CARSI (see Table 3). The Obama Administration requested an additional $100 million
for CARSI in FY2011; however, Congress has yet to pass an appropriations bill for the entire
fiscal year. Foreign aid programs are currently funded through a series of continuing resolutions
(P.L. 111-242, P.L. 111-290, P.L. 111-317, P.L. 111-322, P.L. 112-4, and P.L. 112-6). The
continuing resolutions, as amended, continue funding most foreign operations programs at the
FY2010 enacted level.90 For FY2012, the Obama Administration has again requested $100
million for CARSI.
In March 2011, President Obama announced the Central America Citizen Security Partnership.
Under the partnership, the United States will review current efforts and possibly refocus $200
million in CARSI funds to adapt to changing conditions in the region.91 The $200 million pledge

(…continued)
State, before the House Committee on Foreign Affairs, November 14, 2007.
87 CRS interviews with Central American embassy officials, October 27, November 2, 3, and 9, 2010.
88 U.S. Department of State, Bureau of Public Affairs, “The Central America Regional Security Initiative: CitizenSafety—A Shared Partnership,” Fact Sheet, January 26, 2011.
89 This section partially draws from CRS Report R40135, Mérida Initiative for Mexico and Central America: Funding
and Policy Issues, by Clare Ribando Seelke.
90 For more information on the FY2011 foreign operations budget, see CRS Report R41228, State, Foreign Operations,
and Related Programs: FY2011 Budget and Appropriations, by Marian Leonardo Lawson, Susan B. Epstein, and
Tamara J. Resler.
91 White House, “The Central America Citizen Security Partnership,” Fact Sheet, March 21, 2011.
Central America Regional Security Initiative: Background and Policy Issues for Congress
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consists of funds that were previously appropriated for CARSI but have yet to be expended and
possibly funds that have already been requested for CARSI but have yet to be appropriated.92
Table 3. Funding for the Central America Regional Security Initiative,
FY2008-FY2012
($ in thousands)
Account
FY2008
(Actual)
FY2009
(Actual)
FY2010
(Actual)a
FY2011
(Request)b
FY2012
(Request)
ESF 25,000 18,000 23,000 n/a 45,000
INCLE 24,800 70,000 65,000 n/a 55,000
NADR 6,200 — — n/a —
FMF 4,000 17,000 7,000 n/a —
Total 60,000 105,000 95,000 100,000 100,000
Sources: U.S. Department of State, Congressional Budget Justification for Foreign Operations, Fiscal Year 2012,
March, 2011; U.S. Department of State, FY 2010 Spending Plan for the Central America Regional Security Initiative,
July 29, 2010.
Notes: ESF = Economic Support Fund; INCLE = International Narcotics Control and Law Enforcement; NADR
= Nonproliferation, Anti-Terrorism, De-mining and Related Programs; and FMF = Foreign Military Financing.
a. In the 2010 Consolidated Appropriations Act (P.L. 111-117), Congress appropriated “up to” $83 million for
the countries of Central America “only to combat drug trafficking and related violence and organized crime,
and for judicial reform, institution building, anti-corruption, rule of law activities, and maritime security.”
After consultations with Congress, the Department of State allocated an additional $12 million in ESF from
funds appropriated to its Western Hemisphere Regional account to crime and violence prevention
programs administered by USAID, bringing total FY2010 CARSI funding to $95 million.
b. CARSI funds were not broken down by account in the Obama Administration’s FY2011 request; however,
the Department of State indicated that $100 million of the funds requested for the Western Hemisphere
Regional account would go to the initiative. Since Congress has yet to pass FY2011 appropriations
legislation for the entire fiscal year, government programs are currently funded by a series of continuing
resolutions. The continuing resolutions, as amended, continue funding most foreign operations programs at
the FY2010-enacted level.
FY2008 Appropriations
When announcing the Mérida Initiative, the Bush Administration originally requested $50 million
for the countries of Central America. All of the funds were requested in the International
Narcotics Control and Law Enforcement (INCLE) account, and were designated to be used for
public security and law enforcement programs. Members of Congress, some of whom expressed
considerable disappointment that they were not consulted as the plan was being formulated,93
dedicated additional funds to Central America and broadened the focus of the initiative.
Through the FY2008 Supplemental Appropriations Act (P.L. 110-252), Congress appropriated
$60 million for Central America and divided the funds among the following accounts: INCLE;

92 CRS correspondence with State Department official, March 25, 2011.
93 U.S. Congress, House Committee on Foreign Affairs, The Merida Initiative: Assessing Plans to Step Up Our
Security Cooperation with Mexico and Central America, 110th Cong., 1st sess., November 14, 2007, Serial No. 110-135
(Washington: GPO, 2008).
Central America Regional Security Initiative: Background and Policy Issues for Congress
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Economic Support Fund (ESF); Nonproliferation, Anti-Terrorism, De-mining and Related
Programs (NADR); and Foreign Military Financing (FMF). Congress allotted $25 million in ESF
funds for the creation of an Economic and Social Development Fund for Central America, $20
million of which was to be administered by USAID and $5 million of which was to be
administered by the State Department to support educational and cultural exchange programs.
Congress also allotted $1 million to support the International Commission against Impunity in
Guatemala (CICIG).94 The act required the State Department to withhold 15% of the INCLE and
FMF assistance appropriated for the countries of Central America until the Secretary of State
could report that the Central American governments were taking steps to improve respect for
human rights, such as creating police complaints commissions, reforming their judiciaries, and
investigating and prosecuting military and police forces that had been credibly alleged to have
committed human rights violations.
FY2009 Appropriations
In the FY2009 Omnibus Appropriations Act (P.L. 111-8), Congress provided $105 million in
funding for Central America. It required that at least $35 million of the funds appropriated for the
region be used to support judicial reform, institution building, anti-corruption, and rule of law
activities. The explanatory statement to the act directed that $70 million of the funds for the
region be provided through the INCLE account, that $15 million of the FMF funds support
maritime security programs, and that $12 million in ESF support USAID’s Economic and Social
Development Fund for Central America. The FY2009 funds were subject to the same human
rights conditions as the funds provided through the FY2008 supplemental.
FY2010 Appropriations
In the FY2010 Consolidated Appropriations Act (P.L. 111-117), Congress appropriated “up to”
$83 million for the countries of Central America “to combat drug trafficking and related violence
and organized crime, and for judicial reform, institution building, anti-corruption, rule of law
activities, and maritime security.” After consultations with Congress, the Department of State
allocated an additional $12 million in ESF from funds appropriated to its Western Hemisphere
Regional account to crime and violence prevention programs administered by USAID, bringing
total FY2010 CARSI funding to $95 million. The conference report to the act (H.Rept. 111-366)
split Central America funding from the Mérida Initiative and placed it under a new Central
America Regional Security Initiative (CARSI). The Obama Administration embraced the change
as a way to focus more attention on the situation in Central America and U.S. efforts in the
region. In addition to subjecting CARSI funds to the same human rights conditions as previous
years, the conference report to the act directed the Secretary of State to submit a report within 90
days of enactment detailing regional threats or problems to be addressed in the region, as well as
realistic goals for U.S. efforts and actions planned to achieve them.
Programs
Through CARSI, the United States funds a variety of activities designed to support U.S. and
Central American security objectives. U.S. agencies provide partner nations with equipment,

94 For more information on CICIG, see the text box titled “The International Commission Against Impunity in
Guatemala: A Regional Model?” in the “Law Enforcement Approaches” section above.
Central America Regional Security Initiative: Background and Policy Issues for Congress
Congressional Research Service 23
technical assistance, and training to improve narcotics interdiction and disrupt criminal networks
that operate in the region, as well as in the United States. CARSI-funded activities also provide
support for Central American law enforcement and justice sector institutions, identifying
deficiencies and building their capacities to ensure the safety and security of the citizens of the
region. In addition, CARSI supports prevention efforts that seek to reduce drug demand and
provide at-risk youth with educational, vocational, and recreational opportunities. Many of the
activities funded by CARSI build on previous security efforts in the region. U.S. officials assert
that although CARSI allows the United States to set up pilot programs that demonstrate
potentially successful approaches to improving security conditions, it is up to Central American
nations themselves to sustain successful programs and apply the lessons learned nationwide.95
A number of U.S. and partner nation agencies are involved in developing and supporting CARSI
activities. The U.S. agencies involved include the Departments of State, Defense, and Treasury;
Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE); Customs and Border Patrol (CBP); the U.S. Coast
Guard; the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI); the Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA);
the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives (ATF); the Office of Overseas
Prosecutorial Development, Assistance and Training (OPDAT); and the U.S. Agency for
International Development (USAID).96 CARSI working groups within U.S. embassies include
representatives of the relevant agencies present at each post and serve as the formal mechanism
for interagency coordination in the field.97
The U.S.-SICA dialogue serves as the forum for regional coordination, while bilateral
coordination varies by country. Coordination is particularly close in Honduras, where a bilateral
CARSI task force, co-chaired by the U.S. Ambassador and President Lobo, convenes quarterly.
The task force has established eight working groups, which undertake joint planning related to the
security issues prioritized by the Honduran government.98 Coordination with some of the other
Central American nations, however, is less robust. Although the United States has good relations
with many parts of the Salvadoran government, it reportedly refuses to work with the Minister of
Public Security.99 In Nicaragua, the United States has limited contact with many sectors of the
government but works closely with the Nicaraguan Navy.100
Narcotics Interdiction and Law Enforcement Support
The bulk of U.S. assistance provided through CARSI provides Central American nations with
equipment and related maintenance, technical support, and training to support narcotics
interdiction and other law enforcement operations. In addition to the provision and refurbishment
of aircraft, boats, and other vehicles, CARSI provides communications, border inspection, and

95 CRS interview with State Department official at the U.S. Embassy in Guatemala, January 19, 2011.
96 U.S. Department of State, “The Central America Regional Security Initiative,” January 25, 2011.
97 U.S. Government Accountability Office (GAO), Mérida Initiative: The United States Has Provided
Counternarcotics and Anticrime Support but Needs Better Performance Measures, GAO-10-837, July 2010,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-10-837. 98 INCSR, March 2011, op. cit.
99 The Minister of Public Security—who like many members of the current FMLN Administration in El Salvador
fought against the U.S.-backed government during the country’s civil war—is alleged to have played a role in the 1985
killing of four U.S. marines. Tim Johnson, “El Salvador’s long-ago civil war still colors U.S. relations,” Miami Herald,
March 17, 2011.
100 INCSR, March 2011, op. cit.
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security force equipment such as radios, computers, X-ray cargo scanners, narcotics identification
kits, weapons, ballistic vests, and night-vision goggles. Although the types of equipment and
training vary according to the capabilities and needs of each Central American nation, in general,
the assistance is designed to extend the reach of the region’s security forces and enable countries
to better control their national territories. For example, an aviation support program is providing
Guatemala with helicopters that enable security forces to rapidly reach areas of the country that
would otherwise be too difficult or dangerous to access, thereby limiting sanctuaries for DTOs.
The program was launched in FY2009 and is expected to last four years, at which point the
Guatemalan government would become responsible for sustaining it.101
U.S. assistance provided through CARSI also supports specialized law enforcement units that are
vetted by, and work with, U.S. personnel to investigate and disrupt the operations of transnational
gangs and trafficking networks. FBI-led Transnational Anti-Gang (TAG) units, which were first
created in El Salvador in 2007, are now expanding to Guatemala and Honduras with CARSI
support. According to the FBI, intelligence collected by the Salvadoran TAG unit has been used
to convict criminals in both El Salvador and the United States.102 DEA, ICE, and the Department
of State’s Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs (INL) also have vetted
unit programs throughout Central America. Among other activities, they conduct complex
investigations into money laundering, bulk cash smuggling, and the trafficking of narcotics,
firearms, and persons.103 Although these units have produced some notable successes, they are
small and difficult to maintain, given the broader context of corruption within many Central
American law enforcement institutions. In El Salvador, for example, the DEA-vetted unit was
reduced from 22 members to eight after polygraph tests demonstrated that nearly two-thirds of the
officers were no longer suitable for the unit.104
Institutional Capacity Building
In addition to immediate support for law enforcement efforts, CARSI provides funding to identify
deficiencies and build long-term capacity within law enforcement and justice sector institutions.
INL and USAID community-policing programs are designed to build local confidence in police
forces by converting them into more community-based, service-oriented organizations.105 One
such program, the Villa Nueva model precinct in Guatemala, is being replicated with CARSI
funding as a result of its success in establishing popular trust and reducing violence.106 To
improve the investigative capacity of Central American nations, CARSI has supported
assessments of forensic laboratories, the implementation of ATF’s Electronic Trace Submission
(eTrace) System to track firearms, and the expansion of the FBI’s Central America Fingerprint
Exchange (CAFE), which assists partner nations in developing fingerprint and biometric
capabilities. CARSI also seeks to reduce impunity by improving the efficiency and effectiveness
of Central American judicial systems. U.S. agencies provide training and technical assistance
designed to enhance prosecutorial capabilities, improve the management of courts, and facilitate

101 U.S. Department of State, FY 2010 Spending Plan for the Central America Regional Security Initiative (CARSI),
July 29, 2010.
102 CRS interview with FBI attaché at the U.S. embassy in El Salvador, January 18, 2011.
103 FY 2010 Spending Plan for CARSI, July 2010, op. cit.
104 CRS interview with DEA attaché at the U.S. embassy in El Salvador, January 18, 2011.
105 CRS interview with USAID officials in El Salvador, January 18, 2011.
106 CRS interviews with Villa Nueva model precinct officers, January 19, 2011.
Central America Regional Security Initiative: Background and Policy Issues for Congress
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coordination between justice sector entities. Moreover, they provide training and technical
assistance to improve prison management, which repeatedly has been identified as a major
weakness throughout the region.107
Prevention
Beyond providing support for law enforcement and institutional capacity-building efforts, CARSI
funds a variety of prevention programs designed to address underlying economic and social
conditions that leave communities vulnerable to crime and violence. USAID asserts that Central
American youth often see few alternatives to gangs and other criminal organizations as a result of
the social and economic exclusion that stems from dysfunctional families, high levels of
unemployment, minimal access to basic services, ineffective government institutions, and
insufficient access to educational and economic opportunities. Through its management of
CARSI funds allocated to the congressionally created Economic and Social Development Fund
for Central America, USAID supports prevention programs designed to address these issues by
providing educational, recreational, and vocational opportunities for at-risk youth.108
Although projects vary by country, nearly all are community-based and municipally led as a
result of lessons learned through previous efforts in the region.109 In El Salvador, for example,
USAID’s Community-Based Crime and Violence Prevention Project works in 12 municipalities
to strengthen the capacities of local governments, civil society organizations, community leaders,
and youth to address the problems of crime and violence. Prevention councils in each
municipality analyze problems within the community and develop prevention plans to address
those problems through activities ranging from vocational training to social entrepreneurship
projects.110 USAID has expanded the reach of its CARSI efforts in many countries by
supplementing the funds provided through the initiative with funds appropriated for bilateral
assistance.111
Implementation
Some Members of Congress and Central American officials have expressed frustration over the
relatively slow pace of implementation of CARSI.112 As of March 2010, only 25% of the funds
appropriated for Mérida/CARSI had been obligated and 8% had been expended. According to the
Government Accountability Office (GAO), the slow pace is the result of a number of challenges
faced by the agencies charged with implementing the initiative, including insufficient staff to
administer programs, the time-consuming U.S. government procurement process, and legislative
withholding requirements that prevent some funds from being released until certain reporting

107 FY 2010 Spending Plan for CARSI, July 2010, op. cit.
108 Ibid.
109 CRS interview with USAID officials in El Salvador, January 18, 2011.
110 U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID), “Community-Based Crime and Violence Prevention Project,”
News Bulletin, October 2010.
111 U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID), “Central America Regional Security Initiative (CARSI),”
Fact Sheet, June 17, 2010; CRS interview with USAID officials in El Salvador, January 18, 2011.
112 U.S. Congress, House Committee on Foreign Affairs, Subcommittee on the Western Hemisphere, Assessing the
Merida Initiative: A Report from the Government Accountability Office (GAO), 111th Cong., 2nd sess., July 21, 2010,
Serial No. 111-109 (Washington: GPO, 2010); CRS interviews with Central American embassy officials, October 25,
November 3 and 9, 2010.
Central America Regional Security Initiative: Background and Policy Issues for Congress
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requirements are met.113 The need to negotiate agreements with seven different countries has also
proved challenging. Changes in the governments of El Salvador and Panama, and repeated
changes in top-level officials in Guatemala, required U.S. officials to restart negotiations and
delay program implementation.114 In Honduras, the June 2009 ouster of President Manuel Zelaya
led the United States to suspend assistance and cooperation with the country until the
inauguration of a new President in February 2010.115
Implementation appears to be accelerating now that agreements with partner nations are in place,
initial planning is complete, and programs are under way. As of March 10, 2011, 88% of the
funds appropriated for Mérida/CARSI had been obligated and 19% had been expended (see Table
4).116 U.S. agencies have helped expedite the process in several ways. Some posts in Central
America reprogrammed existing bilateral assistance funds in order to initiate CARSI activities
while waiting for CARSI funds to become available.117 Likewise, the Department of State is
addressing staffing issues by creating up to 20 new INL positions in the region and setting up
enhanced procurement support in Colombia.118
Table 4. Status of Central America Regional Security Initiative Funds, March 2011
($ in thousands)
Account
Amount
Appropriateda
Amount
Obligated
Amount
Expended
Percent
Obligated
Percent
Expended
ESF 66,000 60,850 14,500 92 22
INCLE 159,800 134,930 28,230 84 18
NADR 6,200 6,200 5,160 100 83
FMF 28,000 25,900 1,410 93 5
Total 260,000 227,880 49,300 88 19
Source: U.S. Department of State data provided to CRS, March 28, 2011.
Notes: ESF = Economic Support Fund; INCLE = International Narcotics Control and Law Enforcement; NADR
= Nonproliferation, Anti-Terrorism, De-mining and Related Programs; and FMF = Foreign Military Financing.
a. Includes all funds appropriated for Mérida/CARSI between FY2008 and FY2010.
Performance Measures
To measure the effects of CARSI, USAID is overseeing an impact evaluation of its crime
prevention programs. The evaluation, conducted by Vanderbilt University’s Latin American
Public Opinion Project (LAPOP), consists of five elements: (1) community surveys; (2) reviews
of demographic data; (3) focus groups; (4) interviews with stakeholders; and (5) community
observations. LAPOP will measure these citizen security indicators every 18 months, both in

113 GAO, July 2010, op. cit. For more information on withholding requirements, see “Funding from FY2008-FY2012”
above and “Human Rights Concerns” below.
114 Ibid.
115 INCSR, March 2011, op. cit.
116 Data provided to CRS by the State Department, March 28, 2011.
117 GAO, July 2010, op. cit.
118 CRS interview with State Department official, February 25, 2011.
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treatment communities where USAID crime prevention programs are in place and in control
communities where no activities have been implemented. By tracking perception changes over
time, USAID hopes to identify successful crime prevention programs and why they succeed so
that resources can be dedicated to the most effective programs and best practices can be replicated
throughout the region.119
CARSI programs other than USAID’s crime prevention programs are generally measured in
terms of outputs, such as the number of people trained or the amount of equipment delivered. The
GAO asserts that these types of measures limit the U.S. government’s ability to assess the
performance of CARSI programs since they do not measure the impact of the training or
equipment or if it has been successfully employed.120
Additional Issues for Congressional Consideration
Funding Issues
As Congress evaluates budget priorities and how to best utilize scarce resources, it is likely to
consider the form of U.S. security assistance to Central America. When the Mérida Initiative was
first announced, some Members of Congress questioned why the Bush Administration’s budget
request included only $50 million for Central America, as compared to $500 million for
Mexico.121 Then-Assistant Secretary of State for Western Hemisphere Affairs Thomas Shannon
noted that it was an initial request and that the Administration hoped that it could work with
Central American nations to build a larger program over time.122 Although U.S. assistance
provided to the region through Mérida/CARSI has increased by more than 50% since FY2008,
Central American leaders and some Members of Congress assert that the resources being
provided are insufficient given the challenges facing the region.123 Many analysts note that
CARSI, at its current funding level, is unlikely to alter outcomes given the relatively weak
positions from which most Central American nations are starting.124 At the same time, some U.S.
officials maintain that the region must move away from the mind-set that the United States is the
fundamental solution to every problem, and that current CARSI funding demonstrates that the
United States is committed to working in partnership with the region to address security
challenges.125
When debating future funding levels, Congress may consider the political will of Central
American nations. Some analysts assert that even if the United States were to greatly increase the

119 GAO, July 2010, op. cit.; USAID CARSI Fact Sheet, June 2010, op. cit.
120 GAO, July 2010, op. cit.
121 U.S. Congress, House Committee on Foreign Affairs, The Merida Initiative: Assessing Plans to Step Up Our
Security Cooperation with Mexico and Central America, 110th Cong., 1st sess., November 14, 2007, Serial No. 110-135
(Washington: GPO, 2008).
122 Shannon testimony, November 2007, op. cit.
123 U.S. Congress, Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, Subcommittee on Western Hemisphere, Peace Corps and
Global Narcotics Affairs, U.S. Policy Towards Latin America, 112th Cong., 1st sess., February 17, 2011; Mary Beth
Sheridan, “Central American leaders plead for more U.S. anti-drug help,” Washington Post, September 30, 2010.
124 Dudley, May 2010, op. cit.; Kevin Casas-Zamora, “Paying Attention to Central America’s Drug Trafficking Crisis,”
Brookings Institution, November 1, 2010.
125 CRS interview with State Department official in El Salvador, January 18, 2011.
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amount of assistance it provides through CARSI, it would do little good as long as Central
American leaders lack the political will to tackle long-standing issues such as incomplete
institutional reforms, precarious tax bases, and the lack of opportunities for young people.126
Despite frequent promises from leaders to address these issues, few have actually taken concrete
steps toward doing so. For example, while Guatemala has established a police reform commission
to suggest ways to improve the country’s law enforcement bodies, the government has been
unwilling to take on tax reform, and has shifted resources away from justice and law enforcement
efforts to fund social programs.127 Without greater commitment from partner countries to
undertake necessary reforms and sustain current efforts, CARSI programs could meet the same
end as previous U.S.-backed counternarcotics programs in the region, which simply faded away
once U.S. assistance declined.128
Another funding issue Congress may consider is resource coordination, both within the U.S.
government and between the U.S. government and other international donors. In FY2010, Central
American countries received $95 million through CARSI. The same year, the region received
nearly $21 million in counternarcotics training and equipment from the Department of Defense129
and some $283 million in additional assistance from the State Department and USAID, which
included $21 million for security purposes such as counternarcotics efforts, rule of law programs,
security sector reform, and combating transnational crime.130 While some U.S. embassies in
Central America appear to be closely coordinating the use of CARSI, Department of Defense, and
bilateral funds so that they serve complementary purposes,131 it is unclear whether this is true
throughout the region.
Even if there is close coordination among U.S. agencies, U.S. assistance only represents roughly
one-third of the international aid provided to the region.132 According to a forthcoming study,
international donors committed or dispersed a combined $1.5 billion to Central America for
security and violence prevention efforts between FY2008 and FY2010. The study shows there is
very little coordination among the various donors’ efforts, and that in some cases, donors fund
programs that duplicate efforts or even support conflicting goals.133 Improved international
coordination could allow the United States to better focus its own efforts and thereby increase the
impact of its programs.

126 Casas-Zamora, November 2010, op. cit.
127 INCSR, March 2011, op. cit; CRS interview with State Department official in Guatemala, January 19, 2011.
128 GAO, August 1994, op. cit.
129 This data reflects non-budget quality estimates of Department of Defense counternarcotics programs funded under
Section 1004 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1991, as amended. Data provided to CRS by
the Department of Defense, March 22, 2011.
130 U.S. Department of State appropriations data made available by the Foreign Assistance Dashboard,
http://foreignassistance.gov/DataView.aspx.
131 CRS interview with the CARSI Working Group in Guatemala, January 19, 2011.
132 The majority of the other two-thirds is provided by the Europeans and the international financial institutions.
Valenzuela testimony, February 2011, op. cit.
133 Forthcoming study by WOLA and the Inter-American Development Bank, presented at a “Friends of Central
America” meeting, February 14, 2011; Adriana Beltrán, “Stronger than the Iron Fist: Funes Administration Attempts a
Different Approach to Crime and Violence in El Salvador,” WOLA, March 18, 2011.
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Human Rights Concerns
Congress remains concerned about how alleged human rights abuses committed by military and
police forces in some Central American countries are investigated and punished, the transparency
of judiciary systems in the region (particularly in Nicaragua), and whether security forces accused
of committing past abuses are being held accountable for their actions (particularly in
Guatemala).134 As with Mexico, appropriations legislation that has provided funding for Mérida
Initiative and CARSI programs in Central America has contained vetting requirements (per
Section 620J of the Foreign Assistance Act [FAA] of 1961)135 and human rights conditions.
Specifically, P.L. 110-252, P.L. 111-8, and P.L. 111-117 have required that 15% of INCLE and
FMF assistance be withheld until the Secretary of State reports in writing that the governments of
the countries in Central America are taking action in three areas:
1. establishing police complaints commissions with authority and independence to
receive complaints and carry out effective investigations;
2. implementing reforms to improve the capacity and ensure the independence of
the judiciary; and
3. investigating and prosecuting members of the federal police and military forces
who have been credibly alleged to have committed violations of human rights.
Each of those appropriations bills has placed additional restrictions on FMF and international
military education and training (IMET) assistance to Guatemala and limited them to certain parts
of the Guatemalan military.
The State Department has submitted human rights progress reports to congressional appropriators
for Belize, Costa Rica, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, and Panama for FY2010. It did not
submit a human rights report for Nicaragua in FY2010 since it was unable to report progress.
Human rights organizations have generally lauded the inclusion of human rights conditions in
Mérida/CARSI legislation, but some U.S. officials have privately complained about the number
of restrictions and requirements placed on the assistance. When combined with the delay in
appropriations legislation for each of the past several fiscal years, consultations with
congressional appropriators related to the so-called “15% withholding requirement” reports
mentioned above have contributed to significant delays in funds being released. While FMF funds
can be spent over two fiscal years, INCLE funds must be spent in the fiscal year in which they are
appropriated. In recent years, this has created challenges for embassies, which have not received
some Mérida/CARSI funding until July or August that must be obligated by the end of the fiscal
year in September.

134 For a summary of recent human rights developments in each country, see U.S. Department of State, Country
Reports on Human Rights Practices, available at http://www.state.gov/g/drl/rls/hrrpt/.
135 According to Section 620J of the FAA of 1961, units of a foreign country’s security forces are prohibited from
receiving assistance if the Secretary of State receives “credible evidence” that such units have committed “gross
violations of human rights.” In response to this provision, the State Department has developed vetting procedures for
potential security force trainees.
Central America Regional Security Initiative: Background and Policy Issues for Congress
Congressional Research Service 30
Relation to Other U.S. Government Policies
An innovative component of the Mérida Initiative, as it was originally conceived, was the
principle of “shared responsibility,” or the idea that all countries involved in the initiative—the
United States, Mexico, and the seven countries of Central America—would take steps to tackle
domestic problems contributing to drug trafficking and crime in the region.136 The Mexican and
Central American governments committed to address corruption and reform their law
enforcement and judicial institutions. For its part, the U.S. government pledged to address drug
demand, weapons smuggling, and money laundering.137 The importance of “shared
responsibility” has been reiterated by President Obama, Secretary of State Hillary Clinton, and
other Administration officials in meetings and public events with Mexican and Central American
officials. The Obama Administration has also begun to address some Central American
governments’ concerns about U.S. deportation policy. While Mexican and Central American
officials have welcomed the new rhetoric, they have periodically challenged the U.S.
government’s commitment to matching words with deeds, particularly with respect to U.S. gun
policy and addressing drug consumption.138
U.S. government efforts to address each of the issues mentioned above are carried out by several
different domestic agencies. When debating future support for CARSI, Congress may consider
whether to provide additional funding simultaneously for these or other domestic activities that
would enhance the United States’ abilities to fulfill its pledges. The Obama Administration
included an increased focus on reducing U.S. drug demand, particularly among youth, in its 2010
National Drug Control Strategy report and asked for slight increases in funding for prevention
and treatment programs in its FY2011 and FY2012 budget requests.139 Nevertheless, the U.S.
drug control budget remains largely focused on overseas supply-reduction programs and domestic
law enforcement efforts.
In the past few years, U.S. Customs and Border Patrol (CBP) has increased southbound
inspections of vehicles and trains for bulk cash and weapons flowing into Mexico. CBP and U.S.
Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) have worked together to increase operations
against bulk cash smuggling and other forms of money laundering. In December 2009, ICE
opened a bulk cash smuggling detection center to assist U.S. federal, state, and local law
enforcement agencies in tracking and disrupting illicit funding flows. However, the vast majority
of illicit monetary transfers and shipments continue to flow southward undetected.140
Under Project Gunrunner, DOJ and its Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives
(ATF) have made efforts to staunch the flow of illegal guns from the United States to Mexico
through stepped up enforcement of domestic gun control laws and improved coordination with

136 U.S. Department of State and Government of Mexico, “Joint Statement on the Mérida Initiative: A New Paradigm
for Security Cooperation,” October 22, 2007.
137 For more information, see CRS Report R41349, U.S.-Mexican Security Cooperation: the Mérida Initiative and
Beyond, by Clare Ribando Seelke and Kristin M. Finklea. 138 Fred Hiatt, “What Felipe Calderón Wants from the United States,” Washington Post, March 4, 2011.
139 For more information on the National Drug Control Strategy and the Office of National Drug Control Policy, see
CRS Report R41535, Reauthorizing the Office of National Drug Control Policy: Issues for Consideration, by Kristin
M. Finklea.
140 William Booth and Nick Miroff, “Stepped-up Efforts by U.S., Mexico Fail to Stem Flow of Drug Money South,”
Washington Post, August 25, 2010.
Central America Regional Security Initiative: Background and Policy Issues for Congress
Congressional Research Service 31
Mexican law enforcement.141 For these purposes, in part, ATF maintains a foreign attaché in
Mexico City and a regional attaché for Central America in El Salvador to help train law
enforcement officials across the region in how to use the eTrace program. Through this ATF
program, investigators are sometimes able to determine the origin and commercial trail of seized
firearms and, in the process, identify gun trafficking trends and develop investigative leads. In
November 2010, the DOJ Inspector General (IG) released an evaluation of Project Gunrunner.142
The IG recommended that ATF work with DOJ to develop a reporting requirement for multiple
long gun sales, because Mexican DTOs have demonstrated a marked preference for military-style
firearms capable of accepting high-capacity magazines. The IG also recommended that ATF focus
its investigative efforts on more complex criminal conspiracies involving high-level traffickers
rather than on low-level straw purchasers.
In December 2010, DOJ and ATF requested that the Office of Management and Budget (OMB)
clear on an expedited basis (by January 5, 2011) a pilot information collection initiative, 143 under
which federally licensed gun dealers in Southwest border states would be required to report
multiple rifle sales to ATF.144 While ATF withdrew its expedited request, OMB is still reviewing
the proposed information collection initiative. On February 19, 2011, meanwhile, the House
adopted an amendment to the Full-Year Continuing Appropriations Act, 2011 (H.R. 1) that would
have prohibited ATF from implementing this requirement. While the House passed H.R. 1, the
Senate rejected this bill on March 9, 2011, for budgetary considerations.
In February 2011, ATF and Project Gunrunner came under renewed scrutiny for an Arizona-based
investigation known as “Operation Fast and Furious.” ATF whistleblowers alleged that suspected
straw purchasers had been allowed to amass relatively large quantities of firearms as part of longterm gun trafficking investigations. As a consequence, some of these firearms are alleged to have
“walked,” meaning that they were trafficked to gunrunners and other criminals, before ATF
arrested the suspects and seized all of their contraband firearms.145 Some of these firearms were
possibly smuggled into Mexico. Two of these firearms—AK-47 style rifles—were reportedly
found at the scene of a shootout near the U.S.-Mexico border where a U.S. Border Patrol agent
was shot to death.146 Press accounts assert that ATF has acknowledged that as many as 195
firearms that were purchased by persons under ATF investigation as part of Operation Fast and
Furious were recovered in Mexico. Questions, moreover, have been raised about whether a
firearm—an AK-47 style handgun—that was reportedly used to murder a U.S. ICE Special Agent

141 This section on efforts against firearms trafficking was drafted by William J. Krouse, CRS Specialist in Domestic
Security and Crime Policy.
142 U.S. Department of Justice, Office of the Inspector General, Review of ATF’s Project Gunrunner, I-2011-001,
November 2010, 138 pp., http://www.justice.gov/oig/reports/ATF/e1101.pdf.
143 U.S. Department of Justice, Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives, “60-Day Emergency Notice of
Information Collection Under Review: Report of Multiple Sale or Other Disposition of Certain Rifles,” 76 Federal
Register 79021, December 17, 2010.
144 Under this initiative, multiple sales reports would be generated for firearm dispositions involving more than one
rifle within five consecutive business days to an unlicensed person. It would be limited to firearms that are (1)
semiautomatic, (2) chambered for ammunition of greater than .22 caliber, and (3) are capable of accepting a detachable
magazine.
145 James v. Grimaldi and Sari Horwitz, “ATF Probe Strategy Is Questioned,” Washington Post, February 2, 2011, p.
A04.
146 John Solomon, David Heath, and Gordon Witkin, “ATF Let Hundreds of U.S. Weapons Fall Into Hands of
Suspected Mexican Gunrunners: Whistleblower Says Agents Strongly Objected to Risky Strategy,” Center for Public
Integrity, March 3, 2011.
Central America Regional Security Initiative: Background and Policy Issues for Congress
Congressional Research Service 32
in Mexico was initially trafficked by a subject of a Texas-based ATF Project Gunrunner
investigation.147 Attorney General Holder has also called for a review of this operation and other
ATF tactics used to counter Southwest border gun trafficking.
In addition to the issues mentioned above, policymakers in Central America have expressed
concerns that increasing U.S. deportations of individuals with criminal records are worsening the
gang and security problems in the region.148 The Central American countries of Honduras,
Guatemala, and El Salvador have received the highest numbers of U.S. deportations (after
Mexico) for the past several fiscal years. Central American countries have typically had a lower
percentage of individuals deported on criminal grounds than other top-receiving countries like
Mexico, Jamaica, and the Dominican Republic. In FY2009 and FY2010, however, the percentage
of Central Americans deported on criminal grounds increased significantly.
For the past several years, Central American officials have asked the U.S. government to consider
providing a complete criminal history for each deportee who has been removed on criminal
grounds, including whether he or she is a member of a gang. While ICE does not provide a
complete criminal record for deportees, it may provide some information regarding an
individual’s criminal history when specifying why the individual was removed from the United
States. ICE does not indicate gang affiliation unless it is the primary reason for the individual
being deported. Law enforcement officials in receiving countries are able to contact the FBI to
request a criminal history check on particular criminal deportees after they have arrived in that
country. With support from the Mérida Initiative/CARSI, ICE and the FBI have developed a pilot
program called the Criminal History Information Program (CHIP) to provide more information
about deportees with criminal convictions to officials in El Salvador.
The U.S. government does not currently fund any deportee reintegration services programs for
adults in Central America, although it has in the past.149 As a result of budget shortfalls in many
countries, the types of support services provided to deportees returning from the United States are
very limited. The few programs that do exist tend to be funded and administered by the Catholic
Church, nongovernmental organizations, or the International Organization for Migration.
Outlook
The seven nations of Central America face significant security challenges. Well-financed and
heavily armed criminal threats, fragile political and judicial systems, and persistent social
hardships such as poverty and unemployment contribute to widespread insecurity in the region.
The United States has allocated $260 million in security assistance to support Central America
since FY2008 under what is now known as the Central America Regional Security Initiative;
however, security conditions have continued to deteriorate. As Congress evaluates budget

147 Kim Murphy and Ken Ellingwood, “Mexico Demands Answers on Guns,” Chicago Tribune, March 11, 2011, p. 13.
148 Kate Joynes et al., “Central America, Mexico and the United States Formulate Shared Strategy to Fight Gang
Violence,” Global Insight Daily Analysis, April 9, 2008.
149 Testimony of Maureen Achieng, Chief of Mission for the International Organization for Migration (IOM) in Haiti
before the House Subcommittee on the Western Hemisphere, July 24, 2007. Although the U.S. government is not
currently funding deportee reintegration programs for adults in Central America, it is providing small amounts of
funding to IOM to assist unaccompanied minors who have been returned to El Salvador and Nicaragua. CRS phone
interview with State Department official, December 2, 2010.
Central America Regional Security Initiative: Background and Policy Issues for Congress
Congressional Research Service 33
priorities and debates the form of U.S. security assistance to the region, it may consider the fact
that many analysts think that improving security conditions in the region will be a difficult,
multifaceted endeavor. Central American leaders will need to address long-standing issues such
as incomplete institutional reforms, precarious tax bases, and the lack of opportunities for young
people.150 International donors will need to provide extensive support over an extended period of
time.151 And all of the stakeholders involved will need to better coordinate their efforts to support
comprehensive long-term strategies that strengthen institutions and address the root causes of
citizen insecurity.152

150 Casas-Zamora, November 2010, op. cit.
151 Villiers Negroponte, Spring 2010, op. cit.
152 Beltrán, March 2011, op. cit.
Central America Regional Security Initiative: Background and Policy Issues for Congress
Congressional Research Service 34
Appendix. Central America Social Indicators153
Table A-1. Central America Development Indicators
Country
Human
Development
Index (HDI)
Rank
Life
Expectancy at
Birth
Mean Years of
Schooling
(Adults)
Gross
National
Income (GNI)
US $ billions
GNI Per
Capita US $
Out of 169
countries 2010 2010 2008 2008
Panama 54 76.0 9.4 21.0 6,180
Costa Rica 62 79.1 8.3 27.5 6,060
Belize 78 76.9 9.2 0.001 3,820
El Salvador 90 72.0 7.7 21.4 3,480
Honduras 106 72.6 6.5 13.0 1,800
Nicaragua 115 73.8 5.7 6.1 1,080
Guatemala 116 70.8 4.1 36.6 2,680
Source: HDI Rank, Life Expectancy at Birth, Mean Years of Schooling from United Nations Development
Programme, Human Development Report 2010; GNI and GNI per capita from the World Bank, World Development
Report 2010.
Definitions: HDI Rank is determined by using UNDP’s Human Development Index, which is a composite
measure of three basic dimensions of human development: health, education, and income. Calculated for 169
countries, with 1 = highest human development. Life Expectancy at Birth is the number of years a newborn is
expected to live if patterns of mortality prevailing at its birth were to stay the same throughout its life. Mean
Years of Schooling = average number of years of education received by people 25 years old and older in their
lifetime. Gross national income (GNI) from World Bank Atlas Method is the broadest measure of national
income. It measures total value added from domestic and foreign sources claimed by residents. GNI per capita is
GNI divided by midyear population.

153 Prepared by Julissa Gomez-Granger, CRS Information Research Specialist.
Central America Regional Security Initiative: Background and Policy Issues for Congress
Congressional Research Service 35
Table A-2. Central America Poverty and Inequality Indicators
Country
Area in
Square Miles
Population
(2011 Estimate)
Population Below
National Poverty
Line (%)
Income Gini
Co-efficients
Belize 8,867 319,000 n/a n/a
Costa Rica 19,730 4,703,000 18.9 (2009) 48.9 (2007)
El Salvador 21,041 6,226,000 47.9 (2009) 46.9 (2007)
Guatemala 42,042 14,729,000 54.8 (2006) 53.7 (2006)
Honduras 43,278 7,773,000 68.9 (2007) 55.3 (2006)
Nicaragua 59,998 5,896,000 61.9 (2005) 52.3 (2005)
Panama 30,193 3,562,000 26.4 (2009) 54.9 (2006)
Source: Area from U.S. Department of State, Country Background Notes; Population and Population Below
National Poverty Line from ECLAC, Statistical Yearbook for Latin America and the Caribbean 2010; Gini Coefficients from UN Human Development Report online: http://hdr.undp.org/en/statistics/.
Note: Gini Co-efficient—a value of 0 represents absolute equality; a value of 100 represents absolute inequality.
Author Contact Information
Peter J. Meyer
Analyst in Latin American Affairs
[email protected], 7-5474
Clare Ribando Seelke
Specialist in Latin American Affairs
[email protected], 7-5229
Acknowledgments
William J. Krouse, Specialist in Domestic Security and Crime Policy, and Julissa Gomez-Granger,
Information Research Specialist, contributed to this report.
Copyright of Congressional Research Service: Issue Brief is the property of US Congressional
Research Service and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a
listserv without the copyright holder’s express written permission. However, users may print,
download, or email articles for individual use.

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Prepared for Members and Committees of Congress

CRS Report for Congress
Prepared for Members and Committees of Congress
Southwest Border Violence: Issues in
Identifying and Measuring Spillover Violence
Kristin M. Finklea
Specialist in Domestic Security
February 28, 2013
Congressional Research Service
7-5700
www.crs.gov
R41075
Southwest Border Violence: Issues in Identifying and Measuring Spillover Violence
Congressional Research Service
Summary
There has been an elevated level of drug trafficking-related violence within and between the drug
trafficking organizations in Mexico. This violence has generated concern among U.S. policy
makers that the violence in Mexico might spill over into the United States. U.S. federal officials
have denied that the increase in drug trafficking-related violence in Mexico has resulted in a
spillover into the United States, but they acknowledge that the prospect is a serious concern.
The most recent threat assessment indicates that the Mexican drug trafficking organizations pose
the greatest drug trafficking threat to the United States, and this threat is driven partly by U.S.
demand for drugs. Mexican drug trafficking organizations are the major suppliers and key
producers of most illegal drugs smuggled into the United States across the Southwest border
(SWB). The nature of the conflict between the Mexican drug trafficking organizations in Mexico
has manifested itself, in part, as a struggle for control of these smuggling routes into the United
States. Further, in an illegal marketplacesuch as that of illicit drugswhere prices and profits
are elevated due to the risks of operating outside the law, violence or the threat of violence
becomes the primary means for settling disputes.
When assessing the potential implications of the increased violence in Mexico, one of the central
concerns for Congress is the potential for what has been termed spillover violencean increase
in drug trafficking-related violence in United States. While the interagency community has
defined spillover violence as violence targeted primarily at civilians and government entities
excluding trafficker-on-trafficker violenceother experts and scholars have recognized
trafficker-on-trafficker violence as central to spillover. When defining and analyzing changes in
drug trafficking-related violence within the United States to determine whether there has been (or
may be in the future) any spillover violence, critical elements include who may be implicated in
the violence (both perpetrators and victims), what type of violence may arise, when violence may
appear, and where violence may occur (both along the SWB and in the nations interior).
Currently, no comprehensive, publicly available data exist that can definitively answer the
question of whether there has been a significant spillover of drug trafficking-related violence into
the United States. Although anecdotal reports have been mixed, U.S. government officials
maintain that there has not yet been a significant spillover. In an examination of data that could
provide insight into whether there has been a significant spillover in drug trafficking-related
violence from Mexico into the United States, CRS analyzed violent crime data from the Federal
Bureau of Investigations Uniform Crime Report program. The data, however, do not allow
analysts to determine what proportion of the violent crime rate is related to drug trafficking or,
even more specifically, what proportion of drug trafficking-related violent crimes can be
attributed to spillover violence. In conclusion, because the trends in the overall violent crime rate
may not be indicative of trends in drug trafficking-related violent crimes, CRS is unable to
develop fact-based conclusions about trends in drug trafficking-related violence spilling over
from Mexico into the United States.
Southwest Border Violence: Issues in Identifying and Measuring Spillover Violence
Congressional Research Service
Contents
Introduction …………………………………………………………………………………………………………………….. 1
The Southwest Border Region and the Illicit Drug Trade Between the United States and
Mexico ………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………… 2
Demand for Drugs in the United States …………………………………………………………………………. 3
Supply of Illegal Drugs from Mexico ……………………………………………………………………………. 4
Mexican Drug Trafficking Organizations ………………………………………………………………………. 5
Partnerships in the United States …………………………………………………………………………… 10
Activities …………………………………………………………………………………………………………… 11
Relationship Between Illicit Drug Markets and Violence ……………………………………………………. 12
What Is Spillover Violence? ……………………………………………………………………………………………. 13
Characteristics of Spillover Violence ………………………………………………………………………….. 14
Who May Be Implicated in Violence …………………………………………………………………….. 15
What Type of Violence May Arise ………………………………………………………………………… 16
When Violence May Appear ………………………………………………………………………………… 17
Where Violence May Occur …………………………………………………………………………………. 18
Challenges in Evaluating and Responding to Spillover Violence ………………………………………….. 18
Complexity of the Issue …………………………………………………………………………………………….. 19
Defining Goals and Objectives …………………………………………………………………………………… 20
Measuring the Problem ……………………………………………………………………………………………… 20
Is There Spillover Violence? ……………………………………………………………………………………… 21
Analysis …………………………………………………………………………………………………………….. 21
Conclusion ……………………………………………………………………………………………………………………. 26
Figures
Figure 1. Drug Routes Within Mexico and at the United States-Mexico Border ………………………. 7
Figure 2. U.S. Cities Reporting the Presence of Mexican Drug Trafficking Organizations ………… 9
Figure 3. Violent Crime Rate in Selected MSAs ………………………………………………………………… 24
Figure 4. Violent Crime Rate in Selected Southwest Border MSAs ……………………………………… 25
Tables
Table 1. U.S. Illegal Drug Seizures Along the Southwest Border …………………………………………… 5
Contacts
Author Contact Information…………………………………………………………………………………………….. 27
Acknowledgments …………………………………………………………………………………………………………. 27
Southwest Border Violence: Issues in Identifying and Measuring Spillover Violence
Congressional Research Service 1
Introduction
There has been an elevated level of drug trafficking-related violence within and between the drug
trafficking organizations (DTOs) in Mexicoa country with which the United States shares a
nearly 2,000-mile border.1
Estimates have placed the number of drug trafficking-related deaths in
Mexico between December 2006 (when then-Mexican President Felipe Caldern began his
campaign against the DTOs) and December 2012 (when the Caldern administration ended) at
somewhere between 45,000 and 55,000.2
While estimates of drug trafficking-related violence
vary by the source, some have estimated the death toll for 2012 alone at over 9,575.3
This
violence has generated concern among U.S. policy makers that the violence in Mexico might spill
over into the United States. U.S. federal officials have denied that the increase in drug traffickingrelated violence in Mexico has resulted in a spillover into the United States, but they
acknowledge that the prospect is a serious concern.4
As an extension of its counternarcotics
policy, as well as in response to the possibility of violence spillover, the U.S. government is
supporting Mexicos crackdown campaign against DTOs in Mexico through bilateral security
initiatives, including the Mrida Initiative.5
It is also enhancing border security programs and
working to reduce the movement of contraband (drugs, money, and weapons) in both directions
across the Southwest border.
When discussing drug trafficking-related violence in the United States, one important point to
note is that the mere presence of Mexican DTOs in the United States is not in and of itself an
indication of any spillover of Mexican drug trafficking-related violence into the United States.
While their presence may be an indication of the drug problem in general, it does not necessarily
reflect activity directly tied to the recent violence seen in Mexico. The DTOs (Mexican and
others) have been developing sophisticated illicit drug smuggling and trafficking networks for
years. These activities engender violence and associated criminal activity, not just along the
Southwest border but in other areas throughout the country, such as along domestic interstate
distribution networks and in major metropolitan areas.6
The United States has experienced levels

1
Homicide levels in Mexicolargely attributable to drug trafficking and organized crimebegan an escalated climb
after 2007. There is debate as to whether this violence leveled off or slightly decreased in 2012; nonetheless,
researchers have noted that the violence remains elevated. See the University of San Diego, Trans-Border Institute,
Drug Violence in Mexico: Data and Analysis Through 2012, February 2013, pp. 1, 11. For more information on the
drug trafficking organizations in Mexico, see CRS Report R41576, Mexicos Drug Trafficking Organizations: Source
and Scope of the Rising Violence, by June S. Beittel.
2
University of San Diego, Trans-Border Institute, Drug Violence in Mexico: Data and Analysis Through 2012,
February 2013.
3
There have been varying reports about the actual number of drug-related deaths. Reforma is a generally respected
source of data on drug trafficking-related deaths in Mexico, and the source of the estimate cited in this report. For more
information on alternate sources, see the University of San Diego, Trans-Border Institute, Drug Violence in Mexico:
Data and Analysis Through 2012, February 2013.
4
See, for example, CBP Chief Assesses the Border: Alan Bersin, in El Paso, Assures Safety, Backs Mexicos Fight,
El Paso Times, January 6, 2011; as well as Department of Homeland Security, Remarks on Border Security at the
University of Texas at El Paso, January 31, 2011, http://www.dhs.gov/ynews/speeches/sp_1296491064429.shtm.
5
The Mrida Initiative is a multi-year initiative for $1.4 billion in U.S. counterdrug and anticrime assistance to Mexico
and Central America. The details of the Mrida Initiative are not discussed in this report; for more information, see
CRS Report R41349, U.S.-Mexican Security Cooperation: The Mrida Initiative and Beyond , by Clare Ribando Seelke
and Kristin M. Finklea.
6
Drug Enforcement Administration, Statement of Joseph M. Arabit Special Agent in Charge, El Paso Division,
Regarding Violence Along the Southwest Border Before the House Appropriations Committee, Subcommittee on
Commerce, Justice, Science and Related Agencies, March 24, 2009, http://www.usdoj.gov/dea/speeches/s032409.pdf.
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of drug trafficking-related crime for many years.7
The immediate question confronting policy
makers is whether the elevated violence between DTOs in Mexico impacts either the level or
character of drug trafficking-related violence in the United States. A related question is whether
evidence of spillover violence would necessitate a policy response from Congress that is
qualitatively different from the current efforts to combat drug trafficking.
This report focuses on how policy makers would identify any spillover of drug trafficking-related
violence into the United States. It provides (1) an overview of Mexican drug trafficking
organization structures, how they conduct business, and the relationship between the drug
trafficking organizations in Mexico and their partnerships operating here in the United States; (2)
a discussion of the illicit drug trade between Mexico and the United States, as well as a discussion
of factors implicated in drug trafficking-related violence; (3) an analysis of the possible nature of
any spillover violence that may arise, as well as issues involved in accurately identifying and
measuring such violence; and (4) an evaluation of available crime rate data and a discussion of
how this data may or may not reflect changes in drug trafficking-related crime. This report does
not include a discussion of illicit drug enforcement issues,8
nor does it include specific policy
options that may be considered to stem a potential uptick in drug trafficking-related violence.
The Southwest Border Region and the Illicit Drug
Trade Between the United States and Mexico
The nature of the conflict between the DTOs in Mexico has manifested itself, in part, as a
struggle for control of the smuggling routes into the United States.9
Therefore, the prospects for
spillover violence are most keenly anticipated in the Southwest border (SWB) region of the
United States because the region represents the arrival zone for the vast majority of illicit drugs
that are smuggled into the country. The size, geography, and climate of the SWB region have long
presented unique challenges to law enforcement. The southern border with Mexico stretches
nearly 2,000 miles in length, is sparsely populated in some areas, and is dotted with legitimate
crossing points (ports of entry)both large and small. The National Drug Threat Assessment,
2008, summarized the illicit drug threat scenario along the SWB in stark terms:
The Southwest Border Region is the most significant national-level storage, transportation,
and transshipment area for illicit drug shipments that are destined for drug markets
throughout the United States. The region is the principal arrival zone for most drugs
smuggled into the Unites States; more illicit drugs are seized along the Southwest Border
than in any other arrival zone. Mexican DTOs have developed sophisticated and expansive
drug transportation networks extending from the Southwest Border to all regions of the

7
The Organized Crime Drug Enforcement Task Forces (OCDETF) Program, for instance, has been operating since
1982 to combat major drug trafficking and money laundering organizations. For more information on the OCDETF
Program, see http://www.justice.gov/dea/programs/ocdetf.htm. The trends in drug trafficking-related crime across the
United States are currently unknown because federal law enforcement agencies do not systematically track and report
drug trafficking related crimes.
8
For more information, see archived CRS Report R40732, Federal Domestic Illegal Drug Enforcement Efforts: Are
They Working? by Celinda Franco.
9
In addition, the drug related violence in Mexico is also resulting from a struggle between the drug trafficking
organizations and the Mexican government attempting to crack down on the DTOs. For more information, see Scott
Stewart and Alex Posey, Mexico: The War with the Cartels in 2009, Stratfor Global Intelligence, November 9, 2009,
http://www.stratfor.com/weekly/20091209_mexico_war_cartels_2009.
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United States. They smuggle significant quantities of illicit drugs through and between ports
of entry (POEs) along the Southwest Border and store them in communities throughout the
region. Most of the regions principal metropolitan areas, including Dallas, El Paso,
Houston, Los Angeles, Phoenix, San Antonio, and San Diego, are significant storage
locations as well as regional and national distribution centers. Mexican DTOs and criminal
groups transport drug shipments from these locations to destinations throughout the
country.10
The most recent threat assessment indicates that the Mexican DTOs pose the greatest drug
trafficking threat to the United States.11 Demand for illicit drugs in the United States partly drives
this threat.
Demand for Drugs in the United States
The United States is the largest consumer of illegal drugs and sustains a multi-billion dollar
market in illegal drugs.12 According to the Central Intelligence Agency, the United States is the
largest consumer of Colombian-produced cocaine and heroin as well as Mexican-produced heroin
and marijuana. It is also a large consumer of Mexican-produced methamphetamine.13
The latest National Household Survey on Drug Use and Health (NSDUH),14 in 2011, surveyed
individuals aged 12 and older regarding their drug use during the previous month. In 2011, about
22.5 million individuals were current (in the past month) illegal drug users, representing 8.7% of
individuals aged 12 and older.15 This percentage of users had remained relatively stable since
2002.16 Among these drug users, marijuana was the most commonly used drug, with an estimated
18.1 million users (7.0% of the population), followed by nonmedical use of prescription-type
psychotherapeutic drugs (6.1 million users, or 2.4% of individuals). The survey also estimated
that there were 1.4 million users of cocaine (0.5% of Americans), as well as nearly one million
users of hallucinogens (0.4% of the population). Results also estimated 439,000
methamphetamine users (0.2% of the population).

10 U.S. Department of Justice, National Drug Intelligence Center, National Drug Threat Assessment, 2008, Product No.
2007-Q0317-003, October 2007, p. v, http://www.usdoj.gov/ndic/pubs25/25921/25921p.pdf. Hereinafter, NDTA, 2008.
11 U.S. Department of Justice, National Drug Intelligence Center, National Drug Threat Assessment 2011, Product No.
2011-Q0317-001, August 2011. Hereinafter, NDTA, 2011. The 2011 NDTA is the most recent threat assessment.
12 Oriana Zill and Lowell Bergman, Do the Math: Why the Illegal Drug Business is Thriving, PBS Frontline,
http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/drugs/.
13 U.S. Central Intelligence Agency, World Fact Book, available at https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-worldfactbook/index.html.
14 NSDUH is an annual survey of approximately 67,500 people, including residents of households, noninstitutionalized group quarters, and civilians living on military bases. The survey is administered by the Substance
Abuse and Mental Health Services Administration of the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services and is
available at http://oas.samhsa.gov/NSDUHlatest.htm.
15 Ibid.
16 According to the NSDUH, within the period 2002-2011, the annual percentage of illicit drug users in the 12 and
older age group ranged from 7.9% to 8.9%.
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Supply of Illegal Drugs from Mexico
Mexican DTOs are the major suppliers and key producers17 of most illegal drugs smuggled into
the United States across the SWB. Moreover, Mexico is the major transit country for cocaine.
According to the U.S. State Department, [a]pproximately 95 percent of the cocaine flow to the
United States transits the Mexico-Central America corridor from its origins in South America.18
According to the National Drug Threat Assessment, 2011, cocaine availability began decreasing
in U.S. markets in 2007 and has remained below pre-2007 levels since then.19 The decreased
cocaine availability has been attributed to a number of factors, including cocaine eradication,
cocaine seizures, increased worldwide demand for cocaine, pressure on drug trafficking
organizations in Mexico, inter-cartel violence, and border security.20 While cocaine availability
decreased, the availability of heroin; marijuana; methamphetamine; and 3,4-
Methylenedioxymethamphetamine (MDMA) remained, and even increased, in some areas.21
In addition to controlling most of the wholesale cocaine distribution in the United States,
Mexican DTOs also control more of the wholesale distribution of heroin, methamphetamine, and
marijuana than other major drug trafficking organizations in the United States. There has been an
increase in heroin production in Mexicoincluding white powder, black tar, and brown powder
heroinand a subsequent increase in its availability in the United States.22 With respect to
methamphetamine, there was a temporary decline in the supply of Mexican-produced
methamphetamine beginning in 2006, in part because of Mexican import restrictions on precursor
drugs beginning in 2006.23 However, by 2008, the DTOs had circumvented the Mexican chemical
control laws and were using non-ephedrine based production methods, including the phenyl-2-
propanone(P2P) method.24 This has enabled a subsequent uptick in Mexican methamphetamine
flow into the United States. Marijuana availability in the United States has also increased due to
factors such as rising marijuana production in Mexico, increasing marijuana cultivation in the
United States led by criminal networksincluding Mexican DTOs, and decreasing marijuana
eradication in Mexico.25
The true quantity of drugs produced and transported by Mexican DTOs, however, is unknown.
Available data provide insight into the quantity of drugs seized along the SWB, though this data
cannot speak to the total amount of drugs produced and/or transported into the United States, nor
does it provide information about the proportion of these drugs that are actually seized along the
SWB. For instance, Table 1 illustrates federal seizures of illegal drugs along the SWB for

17 Mexican DTOs distribute cocaine (produced primarily in Colombia), and they produce as well as distribute heroin,
methamphetamine, and marijuana.
18 U.S. Department of State, Bureau for International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs, 2012 International
Narcotics Control Strategy Report (INCSR), vol. 1, March 2012, p. 316.
19 NDTA, 2011.
20 U.S. Department of Justice, National Drug Intelligence Center, National Drug Threat Assessment 2010, Product No.
2010-Q0317-001, February 2010. Hereinafter, NDTA, 2010.
21 NDTA, 2011, p. 2.
22 Ibid., pp. 26-27.
23 U.S. Department of Justice, National Drug Intelligence Center, National Drug Threat Assessment 2009, Product No.
2008-Q0317-005, December 2008, p.9, http://www.usdoj.gov/ndic/pubs31/31379/31379p.pdf. Hereinafter, NDTA,
2009.
24 NDTA, 2010, p. 34.
25 NDTA, 2011, pp. 29-30.
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calendar years (CY) 2005-2010. Total drug seizures (measured in kilograms) generally increased
during this time period, despite declines in 2008 and 2010. The decline in seizures for 2010 was
primarily driven by a nearly 141,000 kg drop in marijuana seizures compared to 2009.
Additionally, cocaine seizures along the SWB decreased in 2007 and 2008 relative to previous
years when cocaine seizures had been increasing, but seizures began to increase again in 2009, a
year that was marked by an increase in all major illegal drug seizures except for seizures of
MDMA. MDMA seizures continued to decline in 2010 as well. These data, however, do not
provide insight into the total amount of drugs illegally produced and transported by the DTOs.
Rather, these data reflect an unknown proportion of drugs that the Mexican DTOs are bringing
into the United States through a variety of transportation modes.
Table 1. U.S. Illegal Drug Seizures Along the Southwest Border
(in kilograms)
CY2005 CY2006 CY2007 CY2008 CY2009 CY2010
Cocaine 22,653 28,284 22,656 16,755 17,583 18,623
Heroin 228 489 404 556 839 1,062
Marijuana 1,034,102 1,146,687 1,472,536 1,253,054 1,859,258 1,718,424
MDMA 23 16 39 92 80 59
Methamphetamine 2,918 2,798 1,860 2,201 3,788 5,253
Total 1,059,924 1,178,274 1,497,495 1,272,658 1,881,548 1,743,421
Source: CY2005 CY2008 data are from the U.S. Department of Justice, National Drug Intelligence Center,
National Drug Threat Assessment 2010, Product No. 2010-Q0317-001, February 2010, p.20,
http://www.justice.gov/ndic/pubs38/38661/38661p.pdf. The National Drug Intelligence Center (NDIC) uses data
from the National Seizure System. CY2009 and CY2010 data were provided to CRS by the NDIC.
Mexican DTOs, in addition to being the major supplier of illegal drugs being smuggled into the
United States, have a strong presence within the United States, operating in more than 1,200 U.S.
cities.26
Mexican Drug Trafficking Organizations27
Mexican DTOs are transnational organized crime groups whose criminal activities center
primarily around the drug trade.28 In general, organized crime groups attempt to fill particular

26 Mexican Cartels Migrating to the USA, Borderland Beat, April 11, 2011, http://www.borderlandbeat.com/2011/
04/mexican-cartels-migrate-to-usa.html. See also Anthony Kimery, Mexican DTOs Symbols, Other Identifiers
Described in Intel Bulletin, Homeland Security Today, February 11, 2011, http://www.hstoday.us/blogs/the-kimeryreport/blog/mexican-dtos-symbols-other-identifiers-described-in-intel-bulletin/
fca4201347ffe1c131d3f71e57c604ab.html. Of note, NDIC did not publicly identify the at least 1,286 U.S. cities with
DTO presence.
27 The terms drug trafficking organization (DTO) and drug cartel are terms often used interchangeably. Cartel is one of
the dominant terms used colloquially and in the press, but some experts disagree with using this term because cartel
often refers to price-setting groups and because it is not clear that the Mexican drug trafficking organizations are setting
illicit drug prices. For the purpose of consistency, this report uses the term drug trafficking organization. For more
information on the Mexican DTOs, see archived CRS Report RL34215, Mexicos Drug Cartels, by Colleen W. Cook.
For information on the current violence between the DTOs in Mexico, see CRS Report R41576, Mexicos Drug
Trafficking Organizations: Source and Scope of the Rising Violence, by June S. Beittel.
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illicit market niches. Specifically, DTOs respond to the societal demand for illegal drugs. Some
experts have likened drug trafficking organizations to corporations or even small nation-states.
They are influenced by factors such as geography, politics, economics, and culture.29
Geographically, for example, Mexican DTOs are situated between the worlds largest producer of
cocaine (Colombia) and the worlds largest consumer of cocaine (United States), leading Mexico
to be a natural drug transshipment route between the two countries.30 In addition, major Mexican
criminal organizations focus primarily (though not exclusively) on drugs, because the drug trade
has, to date, generally proven to be more economically lucrative than other illicit activities such
as kidnapping and extortion.31 Nonetheless, Mexican DTOs have diversified their operations,
adding to their portfolio crimes ranging from kidnapping and extortion to human trafficking and
intellectual property rights violations.32 These enterprises may help the DTOs supplement their
drug trafficking-related income.
Mexican DTOs either (1) transport or (2) produce and transport drugs north across the United
States-Mexico border.33 Figure 1 illustrates the drug trafficking routes within Mexico and at the
United States-Mexico border. After being smuggled across the border by DTOs, the drugs are
distributed and sold within the United States. The illicit proceeds may then be laundered or
smuggled south across the border. The proceeds may also be used to purchase weapons in the
United States that are then smuggled into Mexico.34 This leads to a general pattern of drugs
flowing north across the border and money and guns flowing south.

(…continued)
28 For more information on organized crime in the United States, see CRS Report R40525, Organized Crime in the
United States: Trends and Issues for Congress, by Kristin M. Finklea; and CRS Report R41547, Organized Crime: An
Evolving Challenge for U.S. Law Enforcement, by Jerome P. Bjelopera and Kristin M. Finklea.
29 Stratfor Global Intelligence, Mexican Drug Cartels: The Net Assessment, March 9, 2008, http://www.stratfor.com/
podcast/mexican_drug_cartels_net_assessment.
30 Stratfor Global Intelligence, Organized Crime in Mexico, March 11, 2008, http://www.stratfor.com/analysis/
organized_crime_mexico.
31 Ibid. Refer to the section in the report, Activities, for more information on other illicit activities engaged in by the
drug trafficking organizations.
32 Grace Wyler, The Mexican Drug Cartels Are A National Security Issue, Borderland Beat, June 14, 2011,
http://www.borderlandbeat..html.
33 As mentioned, Mexican DTOs distribute cocaine (produced in Colombia, Venezuela, and Brazil), and they produce
as well as distribute heroin, methamphetamine, and marijuana.
34 For more information on gun trafficking on the Southwest border, see CRS Report R40733, Gun Trafficking and the
Southwest Border, by Vivian S. Chu and William J. Krouse.
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Figure 1. Drug Routes Within Mexico and at the United States-Mexico Border
Source: Fred Burton and Ben West, When the Mexican Drug Trade Hits the Border, Stratfor Global Intelligence,
April 15, 2009, http://www.stratfor.com/weekly/20090415_when_mexican_drug_trade_hits_border.
Although Mexican DTOs have been active for some time, they have become more prominent
since the decline of the powerful Colombian DTOs beginning in the 1980s.35 The National Drug
Intelligence Center (NDIC), in its 2009 threat assessment, estimated that Mexican DTOs maintain
drug distribution networksor supply drugs to distributors in at least 230 U.S. cities, as
illustrated in Figure 2.
36 More recent NDIC estimates reportedly indicate that the DTOs have
expanded operations and are present in at least 1,286 U.S. cities. Of these operations, 143 are
reported to be controlled directly by DTO members in Mexico.37 Mexican DTOs annually
transport multi-ton quantities of illicit drugs from Mexico into the United States using a variety of
multi-modal transportation methods.38 Estimates are that these drugs generate between $18 billion

35 Stratfor Global Intelligence, Organized Crime in Mexico, March 11, 2008, http://www.stratfor.com/analysis/
organized_crime_mexico. See also archived CRS Report RL34215, Mexicos Drug Cartels, by Colleen W. Cook.
36 U.S. Department of Justice, National Drug Intelligence Center, National Drug Threat Assessment 2009, Product No.
2008-Q0317-005, December 2008, p.49, http://www.usdoj.gov/ndic/pubs31/31379/31379p.pdf. Hereinafter, NDTA,
2009.
37 Mexican Cartels Migrating to the USA, Borderland Beat, April 11, 2011, http://www.borderlandbeat.com/2011/
04/mexican-cartels-migrate-to-usa.html. See also Anthony Kimery, Mexican DTOs Symbols, Other Identifiers
Described in Intel Bulletin, Homeland Security Today, February 11, 2011, http://www.hstoday.us/blogs/the-kimeryreport/blog/mexican-dtos-symbols-other-identifiers-described-in-intel-bulletin/
fca4201347ffe1c131d3f71e57c604ab.html. Of note, NDIC did not publicly identify the at least 1,286 U.S. cities with
DTO presence.
38 NDTA, 2011.
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and $39 billion in U.S. wholesale drug proceeds for the Colombian and Mexican DTOs
annually.39

39 NDTA, 2009, p. 49. According to ONDCP data, the trafficking and distribution of cocaine generates about $3.9
billion, marijuana generates about $8.5 billion, and methamphetamine generates about $1 billion. Jane’s, Security,
Mexico, February 20, 2009.
CRS-9
Figure 2. U.S. Cities Reporting the Presence of Mexican Drug Trafficking Organizations
January 1, 2006-April 8, 2008
Source: National Drug Intelligence Center (NDIC), National Drug Threat Assessment, 2009, Map A5. U.S. cities reporting the presence of Mexican DTOs, January 1,
2006, through September 30, 2008, U.S. Department of Justice, Product No. 2008-Q0317-005, December 2008, http://www.usdoj.gov/ndic/pubs31/31379/
appenda.htm#Map5.
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When conceptualizing Mexican drug trafficking organizations as businesses, policy makers may
question the impact of possible drug trafficking-related violence spillover (into the United States)
on the drug trafficking businessselling drugs in the U.S. black market. Although the effects of
violence on businesses in the black market may not mirror those effects on business in the licit
market, one way of examining this question may be to look at the impact that violence or violent
crimes have on business in general. One study, for example, examined the impact of surges in
violence on businesses in various industries in locations of varying crime rates.40 Results
suggested that surges in violence had the most negative impact on those businesses that were
service-related (e.g., retail and personal service industries) and located in typically low-crime
areas. Specifically, the impact on business was in terms of a reduction in the number of new
businesses, a decrease in business expansions, and a lack of overall business growth. In order to
generalize these findings from retail businesses to drug businesses, one underlying assumption
must be that the locations for buying retail goods and personal services are the same as those for
purchasing drugs. If these findings can be generalized to the drug trafficking business, this could
suggest that any spillover in drug trafficking-related violence to the United States could adversely
affect those service-related businesses (including drug trafficking businesses) in cities with
relatively (pre-spillover) low crime rates. On the other hand, if violence affects businesses in the
licit and illicit markets differently, these findings may not apply to potential effects of drug
trafficking-related violence on drug trafficking business.
There have been anecdotal predictions regarding the impact of violence on drug trafficking
business; Douglas, AZ, police chief Alberto Melis has said that spillover violence would be bad
for business … and theyre [the drug traffickers] businessmen.41 Further, the Drug Enforcement
Administration (DEA) has expressed moderate confidence that there will not be a significant
increase in spillover violenceat least in the short termbecause Mexican trafficking
organizations understand that intentional targeting of U.S. persons or interests unrelated to the
drug trade would likely undermine their own business interests.42 Some have suggested that
major acts of violence in the United States would lead to a federal law enforcement response.
And, the resulting incarceration of perpetrators would be detrimental to the drug trafficking
business.43
Partnerships in the United States
The NDIC has indicated that in order to facilitate the distribution and sale of drugs in the United
States, Mexican DTOs have formed relationships with U.S. street gangs, prison gangs, and outlaw
motorcycle gangs.44 Although these gangs have historically been involved with retail-level drug
distribution, their ties to the Mexican DTOs have allowed them to become increasingly involved

40 Robert T. Greenbaum and George E. Tita, The Impact of Violence Surges on Neighbourhood Business Activity,
Urban Studies, vol. 41, no. 13 (December 2004), pp. 2495-2514.
41 Brady McCombs and Tim Steller, Drug Violence Spillover More Hype Than Reality: Southern Arizona Lawmen
Discount Threat of Cartel Warfare Crossing Border, Arizona Daily Star, April 26, 2009, Tucson Region.
42 Drug Enforcement Administration, Statement of Joseph M. Arabit Special Agent in Charge, El Paso Division,
Regarding Violence Along the Southwest Border Before the House Appropriations Committee, Subcommittee on
Commerce, Justice, Science and Related Agencies, March 24, 2009, http://www.usdoj.gov/dea/speeches/s032409.pdf.
43 Geoffrey Ramsey, Rethinking the Spillover Effect of Mexican Violence, In Sight: Organized Crime in the
Americas, April 12, 2011, http://insightcrime.org/insight-latest-news/item/770-rethinking-the-spillover-effect-ofmexican-violence.
44 NDTA, 2011, p. 11.
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at the wholesale level as well.45 These gangs facilitate the movement of illicit drugs to urban,
suburban, and rural areas of the United States. Not only do these domestic gangs distribute and
sell the drugs, but they also provide warehousing, security, and/or transportation services as
well.46 For example, Barrio Azteca is one of at least nine prominent U.S. prison gangs with ties
to Mexican DTOs.47 Barrio Azteca primarily generates money from smuggling marijuana, heroin,
and cocaine across the Southwest border for the DTOsnamely, the Jurez cartelbut they are
also involved in other crimes, such as extortion, kidnapping, and alien smuggling.48
Activities
Like other organized crime groups, Mexican DTOs are profit-driven. While the primary goods
trafficked by DTOs are drugs, some experts have noted that these organizations do generate
income from other illegal activities, such as the smuggling49 of humans and weapons,
counterfeiting and piracy, kidnapping for ransom, and extortion.50 If the DTOs are not able to
generate income from the drugsdue to any number of reasons (increased Mexican or U.S. law
enforcement, decreased drug supply, decreased drug demand, etc.)they may increase their
involvement in other money-generating illegal activities, such as kidnapping and home invasions.
Take, for example, the number of drug trafficking-related kidnappings for ransom in Phoenix,
AZ.51 In 2009, the NDIC reported 358 such incidents in 2007 and 357 in 2008 (through
December 15, 2008), and indicated that nearly every incident was drug-related.52 These statistics
were revised in the 2010 National Drug Threat Assessment, indicating that kidnappings in
Phoenix reached 260 in 2007, 299 in 2008, and 267 in 2009.53 This decrease in the number of

45 Wholesale refers to the sale of goods to retailers for resale to consumers rather than selling goods directly to
consumers. Retailers, on the other hand, sell goods directly to consumers. Wholesalers tend to sell larger quantities of
goods to retailers, who then sell smaller quantities to consumers.
46 NDTA, 2011., p. 12. See also, National Gang Intelligence Center, 2011 National Gang Threat Assessment: Emerging
Trends, http://www.fbi.gov/stats-services/publications/2011-national-gang-threat-assessment/2011-national-gangthreat-assessment-emerging-trends.
47 Fred Burton and Ben West, The Barrio Azteca Trial and the Prison Gang-Cartel Interface, Stratfor Global
Intelligence, November 19, 2008, http://www.stratfor.com/weekly/
20081119_barrio_azteca_trial_and_prison_gang_cartel_interface.
48 For more information, see Tom Diaz, Barrio AztecaBorder Boys Linked to Mexican Drug Trafficking
OrganizationsPart Three, April 17, 2009, http://tomdiaz.wordpress.com/2009/04/17/barrioazteca%E2%80%93border-bad-boys-linked-to-mexican-drug-trafficking-organizations-%E2%80%94-part-three/. See
also the U.S. Department of Justice website at http://www.usdoj.gov/criminal/gangunit/gangs/prison.html.
49 While drug trafficking organizations may not be directly involved in alien or gun smuggling, they may tax the
smugglers who wish to use the established drug trafficking routes. Further, the NDIC has indicated that drug trafficking
organizations may engage in violent confrontations with the smuggling organizations, as the drug traffickers fear that
the smugglers use of their routes may lead to the traffickers apprehension. See National Drug Intelligence Center,
Office of National Drug Control Policy, Arizona High Intensity Drug Trafficking Area: Drug Market Analysis 2009,
Product No. 2009-R0813-002, March 2009, p.14, http://www.justice.gov/ndic/pubs32/32762/32762p.pdf.
50 Jane’s, Security, Mexico, February 20, 2009. Also, Stratfor Global Intelligence, Mexican Drug Cartels: The Net
Assessment, March 9, 2008, http://www.stratfor.com/podcast/mexican_drug_cartels_net_assessment.
51 Sam Quinones, Phoenix, Kidnap-For-Ransom Capital, Los Angeles Times, February 12, 2009. See also, National
Drug Intelligence Center, Office of National Drug Control Policy, Arizona High Intensity Drug Trafficking Area: Drug
Market Analysis 2009, Product No. 2009-R0813-002, March 2009, http://www.justice.gov/ndic/pubs32/32762/
32762p.pdf.
52 Ibid., p. 18.
53 NDTA, 2010, pp. 15-16.
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reported kidnappings for 2007 and 2008 was reportedly due to a reclassification of certain cases
by the Phoenix Police Department.54 Further, the NDIC reports that kidnappings may be generally
underreported because victims may fear retaliation for reporting or may expose their own
involvement in drug trafficking. Still, Tucson, AZ, police have reported that although there has
been an increase in kidnappings for ransom and home invasions, the suspects in the cases are
local criminalsnot active DTO members from Mexico.55 This disparity in reports indicates that
while there may be an increase in certain illegal activities that may be tied to drug smuggling and
trafficking, these illegal activities are not necessarily directly related to drug trafficking in general
or to Mexican drug trafficking organizations in particular. As such, they may not be valid or
reliable indicators for the presence or absence of drug trafficking-related spillover violence.
Relationship Between Illicit Drug Markets
and Violence
In an illegal marketplace, where prices and profits are elevated due to the risks of operating
outside the law, violence or the threat of violence becomes the primary means for settling disputes
and maintaining a semblance of orderhowever chaotic that order might appear to the outside
observer. This was a fundamental conclusion reached by the National Academy of Sciences Panel
on the Understanding and Control of Violent Behavior.56 Because illegal drug markets operate
outside the law, no courts or other forms of peaceful mediation57 exist for resolving disputes
between drug producers, traffickers, and their customers. As with other black markets, drug
markets are necessarily governed by the threat of violence, which may lead to actual violence.
Illegal drugs and violence, then, are linked primarily through the operations of underground drug
markets.58
Drug trafficking-related violence in Mexico has been elevated, particularly since 2007, and in
2012, there were over 9,575 drug trafficking-related murders in Mexico.59 Mexican drug
trafficking organizations are now at war with each other as well as with the police and military
personnel who are attempting to enforce the drug laws in northern Mexico along the U.S. border.
The DTOs, as a result of enforcement actions in Mexico, along with increasing border
enforcement measures taken by the United States, are finding it more difficult and more costly to
control the production zones and smuggling routes. One of the consequences of this increasingly

54 Of note, the DOJ Inspector General investigated the 2008 Phoenix kidnapping statistics. A preliminary report from
the investigation allegedly finds that of the 358 kidnappings reported, 109 should not have been counted and an
additional 85 cases were in question. See, for example, Federal audit: Major problems in PHX statistics,
abcnews.com, April 25, 2011, http://www.abc15.com/dpp/news/region_phoenix_metro/central_phoenix/federalaudit%3A-major-problems-in-phx-statistics.
55 Brady McCombs and Tim Steller, Drug violence spillover more hype than reality: Southern Arizona lawmen
discount threat of cartel warfare crossing border, Arizona Daily Star, April 26, 2009, Tucson Region.
56 Jeffrey A. Roth, Psychoactive Substances and Violence, National Institute of Justice (Research in Brief Series),
February 1994 (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Department of Justice).
57 Negotiated settlements do occur, although they often feature intimidation.
58 See for example, Peter Andreas and Joel Wallman, Illicit market and violence: what is the relationship?, Crime,
Law, and Social Change, vol. 52, no. 3 (September 2009), pp. 225-230, and Peter Reuter, Systemic violence in drug
markets, Crime, Law and Social Change, vol. 52, no. 3 (September 2009), pp. 275-285.
59 University of San Diego, Trans-Border Institute, Drug Violence in Mexico: Data and Analysis Through 2012,
February 2013.
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competitive environment is a rise in the level of violence associated with the illicit drug trade as
the DTOs struggle for control over territory, markets, and smuggling routes. Policy makers are
thus confronted with the uncomfortable possibility that increased law enforcement (which leads
to increased difficulty and costs to control production zones and smuggling routes, and which in
turn leads to the need to resolve disputes over such territories) could result in increased drug
trafficking-related violence. This appears to be the situation that has developed in Mexico.
This relationship gives rise to a number of important issues for policy makers. One such matter is
evaluating the relative costs and benefits of increased enforcement of the current drug policy
against the potentially elevated levels of violence that such increased enforcement might
engender.60 Could the drug trafficking-related violence currently evidenced in Mexico reach a
level that would prompt U.S. policy makers to consider policy actions that could alter the
underpinnings of the illegal drug market? It does not appear as if the violence has reached such a
level as yet. Policy makers, however, have expressed significant concern over the possibility of
the current violence in Mexico spilling over into the United States.
What Is Spillover Violence?
When assessing the potential implications of increased violence in Mexico as a result of the
increasing tensions between the DTOs located in Mexico, one of the central concerns for U.S.
policy makers is the potential for what has recently been termed spillover violencean
increase in drug trafficking-related violence in United States. Given this concern, it is critical to
develop an understanding of what spillover is, what it might look like, how it might be
measured, and what potential triggers for policy action can be identified from this analysis.
To date, Congress has not adopted a formal definition of spillover violence. Several definitions
and/or qualities of spillover violence have been provided by government officials, as well as
experts and analysts. For instance, according to the DEA, the interagency community has defined
spillover violence in the following manner:
[S]pillover violence entails deliberate, planned attacks by the cartels on U.S. assets,
including civilian, military, or law enforcement officials, innocent U.S. citizens, or physical
institutions such as government buildings, consulates, or businesses. This definition does not
include trafficker on trafficker violence, whether perpetrated in Mexico or the U.S.61
This definition of spillover provides a relatively narrow scope of what may constitute spillover
violence. In particular, it excludes the category of violencetrafficker-on-trafficker violencein
which the vast majority of drug trafficking-related violence in Mexico has occurred. If policy
makers and law enforcement are concerned that the drug trafficking-related violence, as seen in
Mexico, may spill over into the United States, they are necessarily concerned with this
predominant category of trafficker-on-trafficker violence that is excluded from the interagency
communitys definition of spillover violence. The boundaries of what may constitute spillover

60 A Mexican study of the cost-effectiveness of using the military in the drug war (in Ciudad Juarez) has found that
there is a high cost with little success, as murders, kidnappings, extortions, and other crimes continue to increase. See
http://narcosphere.narconews.com/notebook/kristin-bricker/2009/11/numbers-dont-add-mexicos-drug-war.
61 Drug Enforcement Administration, Statement of Joseph M. Arabit Special Agent in Charge, El Paso Division,
Regarding Violence Along the Southwest Border Before the House Appropriations Committee, Subcommittee on
Commerce, Justice, Science and Related Agencies, March 24, 2009, http://www.usdoj.gov/dea/speeches/s032409.pdf.
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violence, as defined by the interagency community, thus makes the likelihood that the United
States will experience this form of spillover violence relatively small. Further, by generally
constraining the definition of spillover violence to those acts that target the government and
innocent civilians, the type of violence necessary to constitute spillover (according to the
interagency definition) may begin to resemble acts of terrorism.62 If so, policy makers and experts
may be challenged with discriminating between spillover violence and terrorism.
Several experts and scholars have also discussed qualities of drug trafficking-related violence that
may constitute spillover, including aspects of trafficker-on-trafficker violence. Such qualities are
analyzed in the following section and may provide policy makers with additional definitions of
spillover violence. Of note, this report does not address non-violent indicatorssuch as rising
corruption of U.S. officials and law enforcementthat could be related to drug trafficking-related
violence spillover.
Characteristics of Spillover Violence
Some experts have suggested that a spillover of violence into the United States may look similar
to the recent surge of violence in Mexico. In Mexico, this increasing violence has been seen
through a rise in both the number of drug trafficking-related murders and the brutality of the
murders. It is also taking the forms of increasing intimidation and fear, attacks on security forces,
assassinations of high-ranking officials, growing arsenals of weapons, and indiscriminate killing
of civilians.63
While a potential spillover of violence into the United States could appear similar to the violence
in Mexico, the violence may be contingent upon numerous factors that differ between the United
States and Mexico. For instance, the U.S. government may respond differently to domestic drug
trafficking-related violence than the Mexican government has, and these differences in responses
could in turn influence the nature of the drug trafficking-related violence seen in each country.
This section of the report discusses several factors that may be of concern as Congress debates the
potential spillover of drug trafficking-related violence. These factors include who may be
implicated in the violence, what type of violence may arise, when violence may appear, and
where violence may occur.

62 18 U.S.C. 2331 defines terrorism as activities that (A) involve violent acts or acts dangerous to human life that are
a violation of the criminal laws of the United States or of any State, or that would be a criminal violation if committed
within the jurisdiction of the United States or of any State; (B) appear to be intended(i) to intimidate or coerce a
civilian population; (ii) to influence the policy of a government by intimidation or coercion; or (iii) to affect the
conduct of a government by mass destruction, assassination, or kidnapping; and (C) occur primarily outside the
territorial jurisdiction of the United States, or transcend national boundaries in terms of the means by which they are
accomplished, the persons they appear intended to intimidate or coerce, or the locale in which their perpetrators operate
or seek asylum. Of note, legislation (H.R. 1270) has been introduced in the 112th Congress that would designate
selected Mexican DTOs as foreign terrorist organizations.
63 Stratfor Global Intelligence, Mexican Drug Cartels: Government Progress and Growing Violence, December 11,
2008, pp. 15-16, http://web.stratfor.com/images/MEXICAN%20Cartels%202008.pdf.
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Who May Be Implicated in Violence
If the drug trafficking-related violence were to spill over from Mexico into the United States,
Congress may be concerned with both the individuals perpetrating the violence as well as the
victims of the violence.
Perpetrators
Reports on the drug trafficking-related violence in Mexico generally indicate that the perpetrators
of violence are active members of DTOs who are vying for territory, avenging betrayals, and
reacting against the Mexican governments crackdown on the traffickers.64 If violence were to
spill into the United States, policy makers may question whether the perpetrators of the violence
will continue to be active drug trafficking members from Mexico, or whether violence will be
inflicted by others who may be more indirectly tied to the DTOs. As mentioned, the DTOs have
connections with U.S. groups such as street gangs, prison gangs, and outlaw motorcycle gangs
who distribute and sell drugs, aid in smuggling drugs, and enforce the collection of drug
proceeds.65 To date, reports from law enforcement on drug trafficking-related violence in the
United States are mixed; while some suggest that violence may be carried out by drug traffickers
or other criminals from Mexico,66 others indicate that domestic drug traffickers or gang members
may be responsible.67
Victims
The violence plaguing Mexico has been directed toward several groups: competing DTOs vying
for territory, Mexican security forces, government officials, and those indebted to the traffickers.
In fact, Mexican government officials have estimated that 90% of the murders in Mexico have
targeted members of drug trafficking organizations.68 Although there have been reports of civilian
bystanders being killed and isolated events of indiscriminate killing, there are not consistent
reports of the drug traffickers targeting civilians who are unconnected to the drug trade.69 There
have been concerns, however, raised by the isolated incidents of U.S. law enforcement agents
killed both in the United States and in Mexico by suspected drug smugglers and traffickers. For
example, U.S. Border Patrol Agent Brian Terry was killed in December 2010 in Arizona,70 and in
February 2011, two ICE agents were shot, one fatally, while driving between Monterrey and

64 CRS Report R41576, Mexicos Drug Trafficking Organizations: Source and Scope of the Rising Violence, by June S.
Beittel.
65 NDTA, 2011., p. 12.
66 See, for example, Randal C. Archibold, Mexican Drug Cartel Violence Spills Over, Alarming U.S., The New York
Times, March 22, 2009.
67 Brady McCombs and Tim Steller, Drug Violence Spillover More Hype Than Reality: Southern Arizona lawmen
discount threat of cartel warfare crossing border, Arizona Daily Star, April 26, 2009, Tucson Region.
68 See testimony by David Shirk, Director, Trans-Border Institute, University of San Diego, before the U.S. Congress,
House Committee on Appropriations, Subcommittee on Commerce, Justice, Science, and Related Agencies, Federal
Law Enforcement Response to US-Mexico Border Violence, 111th Cong., 1st sess., March 24, 2009.
69 CRS Report R41576, Mexicos Drug Trafficking Organizations: Source and Scope of the Rising Violence, by June S.
Beittel. See also Stratfor Global Intelligence, Mexican Drug Cartels: Government Progress and Growing Violence,
December 11, 2008, http://web.stratfor.com/images/MEXICAN%20Cartels%202008.pdf.
70 U.S. Customs and Border Protection, Border Patrol Agent Killed; Suspects in Custody, Others Sought, press
release, December 16, 2010, http://www.cbp.gov/xp/cgov/newsroom/news_releases/national/12162010.xml.
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Mexico City.71 Experts have suggested that [i]f the current security trends [in Mexico] continue
to worsen … the deliberate and sustained targeting of U.S. government personnel will become
more likely.72
If there were to be a significant spillover of violence into the United States, policy makers may
question whether the victims would be of a similar group as the victims of violence in Mexico. To
date, the anecdotal reports of drug trafficking-related violence in the United States indicate that
not only the perpetrators, but the victims of the crimes as well, are all somehow involved in the
drug trade.73 If any significant spillover of drug trafficking-related crime were to follow a similar
pattern, policy makers could expect that individuals on both sides of the violence are connected to
the drug trade.
There are circumstances, however, under which the drug trafficking victims in the United States
could extend to groups beyond those involved in trafficking. If there is an increase in violence
and the U.S. government cracks down on the DTOs similarly to the Mexican government, the
traffickers reactions in the United States may be similar to that seen in Mexicoa surge in
violence against security forces and government officials. Of note, overall violence against
federal law enforcement officials along the SWB has remained relatively constant over the past
several years, with 1,056 assaults against border patrol agents in FY2009 and 1,049 in FY2010.
Examining specific sectors, however, has revealed localized changesincreased assaults against
border patrol agents in the Tucson, AZ, and El Paso, TX, sectors coupled with decreased assaults
against agents in the San Diego, CA, sector.74 It is unclear what proportion of these assaultsif
anymay have been carried out by members or affiliates of Mexican DTOs. Federal officials
have indicated that increased targeting of U.S. law enforcement personnel, similar to that which
has occurred in Mexico, would constitute evidence of spillover.75 If, however, the U.S. response
differs from that of Mexico, the reactions from the DTOs may also differ. Further, a change in the
victim patternto include innocent bystanders, for instancemay represent a departure from
current patterns of drug trafficking-related violence and thus could represent a reasonable trigger
for policy action to mitigate the effects of spillover violence.
What Type of Violence May Arise
In Mexico, the drug trafficking-related violence most often reported is murder. Estimates are that
there were somewhere between 45,000 and 55,000 drug trafficking-related murders between
December 2006 and the end of 2012.76 There have also been reports of kidnappings, home

71 U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement, ICE special agents brutally attacked; suspects sought by authorities,
press release, February 16, 2011, http://www.ice.gov/news/releases/1102/110216washingtondc.htm. See also Tracy
Wilkinson, ICE Agent Killed, Second Wounded at Mexico Drug Gang Blockade, Officials Say, Los Angeles Times,
February 16, 2011, http://articles.latimes.com/2011/feb/16/world/la-fg-mexico-us-agents-20110216.
72 David A. Shirk, The Drug War in Mexico: Confronting a Shared Threat, Council on Foreign Relations, Center for
Preventive Action, Council Special Report No. 60, March 2011, pp. 3-4, http://www.cfr.org/mexico/drug-war-mexico/
p24262.
73 See, for example, Randal C. Archibold, Mexican Drug Cartel Violence Spills Over, Alarming U.S., The New York
Times, March 22, 2009.
74 NDTA, 2011., p. 17.
75 Arthur H. Rotstein, Bersin: Mexican Drug Violence Threat Major Concern, The Associated Press, July 15, 2009,
quoting Alan Bersin the Department of Homeland Security Special Representative of Border Affairs. Further, this type
of violence would be consistent with the interagency definition of spillover violence.
76 University of San Diego, Trans-Border Institute, Drug Violence in Mexico: Data and Analysis Through 2012,
(continued…)
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invasions, and assaults, among other crimes. In the United States, many of the anecdotal reports
citing an increase in violence point to an increase in drug trafficking-related kidnappings and
home invasions. However, the true number of these crimes across the country, and how many
have clear ties to drug trafficking, is unknown. It is also unknown whether or not different types
of violence are more associated with certain crimes (committed by drug traffickers) than with
others. If there were to be a substantial spillover of drug trafficking-related violence from
Mexico, policy makers and law enforcement may be concerned with what types of violence may
appear. Would the types of drug trafficking-related violence already seen in the United States to
date (i.e., kidnappings and home invasions) become more prevalent, or would there be a greater
emergence of the types of violence seen in Mexico (i.e., murders)?
In addition to the type of violence, a spillover or increase in violence could also be measured by
the nature of the violence. As mentioned, the rise in the number of murders in Mexico was also
accompanied by increasing brutality, intimidation, and attacks on individuals other than those
directly involved in the illicit drug trade (i.e., security forces and governmental officials).77 If any
spillover of violence into the United States followed a similar pattern as the violence in Mexico,
there may be an increase in the brutality of crimes in addition to an increase in the pure number of
crimes.
When Violence May Appear
Critical to the assessment of whether the United States is experiencing spillover violence is the
establishment of a realistic timeline for measuring the change in drug trafficking-related violence
in the United States. If the policy goal is to determine if any spillover violence is occurring in the
United States as a result of the increasing violence in Mexico, then it would be logical to look at
trends in drug trafficking-related crime in the United States since the onset of the conditions that
precipitated the recent violence in Mexicoroughly beginning around when former Mexican
President Felipe Caldern took office in December, 2006.78 A comparison of the trends in drugtrafficking related violence (in the United States) before and after this reference point might shed
some light on whether or not the United States is experiencing spillover violence.
As noted, the United States has experienced and continues to experience certain levels of drug
trafficking-related crime. It may be difficult to isolate those drug trafficking-related violent
crimes that are occurring either directly or indirectly as a result of the situation in Mexico.
Therefore, it may also be useful for policy makers to use this same timeframe to measure changes
in other spillover indicators, such as changes in the profile of victims of drug trafficking-related
crime, the number and nature of violent attacks on U.S. law enforcement personnel, and changes
in the nature of drug trafficking-related violence. This could be one means to standardize the
measurement of any potential spillover and to provide policy makers with a more concrete idea of
the trends. The discussion of when the violence occurs begs the question of where to measure any
potential change in violence.

(…continued)
February 2013.
77 Stratfor Global Intelligence, Mexican Drug Cartels: Government Progress and Growing Violence, December 11,
2008, pp. 15-16, http://web.stratfor.com/images/MEXICAN%20Cartels%202008.pdf.
78 CRS Report R41576, Mexicos Drug Trafficking Organizations: Source and Scope of the Rising Violence, by June S.
Beittel.
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Where Violence May Occur
As may be expected, the majority of the discussion surrounding the prospects of spillover
violence in the United States has been focused on the Southwest border (SWB). Initially, this
makes intuitive sense. Even the very term spillover suggests the spread of violence across the
border from Mexicoalmost by osmosis. From a policy perspective, it is useful to question
whether or not a focus exclusively on the border makes sense. Certainly this is where the analysis
should begin as the SWB region is the primary region that links production and smuggling
operations within Mexico to the United States. As noted, however, the drug trafficking
organizations operations within the United States are geographically dispersed in as many as
1,286 or more cities.79 DTOs are businesses, and they not only maintain their own presence in the
United States but also have relationships with U.S. groups such as street gangs, prison gangs, and
outlaw motorcycle gangs to facilitate the distribution and sale of drugs within the United States.
Given that drug trafficking-related violence is prevalent throughout the United States, the task for
policy makers is to concentrate the geographic analysis of changes in drug trafficking-related
violence around areas that would have the greatest likelihood of eliciting evidence of spillover.
One possible method of accomplishing this task could be to look at the various factors discussed
abovechanges in the levels, nature, and victim pattern of drug trafficking-related violence in
selected geographic locationsalong a timeline that corresponds with the escalation of drug
trafficking violence in Mexico. Of course, the critical issue is selecting those geographic
locations. Areas already identified as strategically important to drug trafficking operations here in
the United States would be an optimal place to start. These locations would include cities, states,
and localities in the SWB region, as well as along significant inland distribution routes. Policy
makers may also wish to examine geographic areas that are not currently identified as
strategically important to drug trafficking operations here in the United States, as a control for
comparison.
Challenges in Evaluating and Responding to
Spillover Violence
This section of the report discusses some of the challenges facing policy makers when
considering policy options dealing with drug control and border security issues in general. These
issues are discussed more generally because they provide the context within which any specific
options for dealing with the potential spillover of drug trafficking-related violence will be
determined. These policy challenges include the complexity of the issue, defining goals and
objectives, and measuring the problem.

79 Mexican Cartels Migrating to the USA, Borderland Beat, April 11, 2011, http://www.borderlandbeat.com/2011/
04/mexican-cartels-migrate-to-usa.html. See also Anthony Kimery, Mexican DTOs Symbols, Other Identifiers
Described in Intel Bulletin, Homeland Security Today, February 11, 2011, http://www.hstoday.us/blogs/the-kimeryreport/blog/mexican-dtos-symbols-other-identifiers-described-in-intel-bulletin/
fca4201347ffe1c131d3f71e57c604ab.html.
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Complexity of the Issue
As evidenced through some of the above discussion, there are many federal agencies, state and
local entities, task forces, intelligence centers, and various other groups that are not only involved
in drug control policy in general, but have specific roles in countering threats posed by the
Mexican DTOs. Each of these agencies has different authorities, budgets, resources, and
responsibilities when it comes to the drug control issue. This complexity has also been evident in
the federal governments current response to the increasing drug trafficking-related violence in
Mexico. The policy implication of this intricate web of jurisdictions is that it is difficult to
centralize the establishment, implementation, and evaluation of policiesbe they drug control
policies in general, or the specific policy responses to the increased drug trafficking-related
violence in Mexico.
Several congressional hearings have been held on various aspects of the drug control and drug
trafficking-related violence issues,80 and some congressional policy makers have voiced their
concerns over the lack of centralized direction on these issues. In particular, some in Congress
have expressed concern over who is taking the leadnot just among the involved agenciesbut
within Congress itself.81 Complicated congressional jurisdiction spread across a variety of
committees in both houses means that oversight of the drug control and the drug traffickingrelated violence issues is equally complex. Consequently, coordination of oversight of the areas is
problematic and difficult to manage.
Adding further complexity is the fact that few of the agencies involved in the drug control effort
are solely dedicated to a counterdrug mission (DEA and ONDCP being two of few exceptions).
This presents several challenges in analyzing drug control policy. One challenge, for example,
involves disaggregating an agencys drug control mission and activities from its other missions
and activities. Take, for instance, interdiction at ports of entry. CBP officers select people, goods,
and conveyances for additional scrutiny based on a variety of factors. Often, officers have no idea
what the ultimate outcome of a physical inspection might be. The inspection might uncover illicit
drugs, or it might uncover cash, weapons, or any number of items that are prohibited from
entering the country. How then, may one estimate the portion of CBP officers time that is spent
on the counterdrug effort? This same question applies to the multitude of other agencies that also
have drug control responsibilities. The question becomes even more difficult to answer when the
aim is to analyze a specific drug control policysuch as specific policies targeted toward any
potential spillover violence from Mexico. Disaggregating the drug control mission (or specific
policies), however, is critical on several levels; not only does it affect the measurement of an
agencys progress in implementing drug control efforts, but it also affects the directing of
resources towards these efforts or specific policies.

80 See, for example, U.S. Congress, House Committee on Homeland Security, Subcommittee on Oversight,
Investigations, and Management, On the Border and in the Line of Fire: U.S. Law Enforcement, Homeland Security
and Drug Cartel Violence, 112th Cong., 1st sess., May 11, 2011; and U.S. Congress, Senate Committee on Homeland
Security and Governmental Affairs, Southern Border Violence, 111th Cong., 1st sess., March 25, 2009.
81 See for example, Rob Margetta, Lawmakers Want to Know Who Takes the Lead in Battling Border Violence, CQ
Today Online News, March 10, 2009.
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Defining Goals and Objectives
The definition of success is a critical aspect of policy evaluation. As noted above, the existing
complexities surrounding drug control policies in general, and policies to address the potential
spillover violence from Mexico in particular, complicate the evaluation of these policies. For this
reason, it is important to identify appropriate goals or objectives either for what might be an
overall strategy or for specific policies.
For example, the appropriate domestic policy response to the increased drug trafficking-related
violence in Mexico is difficult to articulate. This is because several forces are at work; it is
tempting to conflate the response to a specific iteration of the problem (the change in drug
trafficking-related violence in Mexico) with the drug control problem in general and, at the same
time, to disaggregate the issue down to so many constituent parts (outbound inspections at the
border, kidnappings in Phoenix, straw purchases82 in Houston, a drug trafficking-related shooting
in El Paso, etc.). This allows for the potential to obscure the actual policy problem to be
confronted. From a policy perspective also, the degree to which this conflation or disaggregation
occurs may not matter in the final analysis if the appropriate metrics are ultimately used to
evaluate each.
With particular relevance to the subject of this report, if the policy task is to identify any potential
or actual drug trafficking-related spillover violence in the United States, and the appropriate drug
activity indicators can be accurately identified, the issue becomes how to correlate any change in
drug activity indicators to the increased drug trafficking-related violence in Mexico. One
potential complication with such an analysis is uniformly defining what constitutes drug-related
violence.
This could potentially be broken down into three general categories: crimes committed by people
under the influence of drugs; economic-compulsive crimes (crimes committed in order to obtain
money or drugs to support drug use); and what are termed systemic drug crimescrimes that
result from the business of trafficking illicit drugs.83 These definitions are important, because
while the commission of crimes by people who are under the influence of illegal drugs and
economic-compulsive crimes present important policy issues in and of themselves, changes in
these indicators contribute little value to the determination of whether or not the United States is
experiencing any spillover violence from Mexico particularly related to the elevated level of drug
trafficking-related violence.
Measuring the Problem
The issue of measurement is important in several different contexts. There are issues with the
collection and reporting of drug control statistics, as well as questions concerning what value the
reported measures have. Because the drug control issue is complex, and so many agencies
participate in its execution, invariably there are going to be differences in how agencies collect

82Straw purchases occur when guns are purchased from licensed gun dealers by eligible persons and then knowingly
transferred to prohibited persons. Straw purchases are illegal under U.S. law (18 U.S.C. 924(a)(1)(A)).
83 Paul J. Goldstein, The Drugs/Violence Nexus: A Tripartite Conceptual Framework, Journal of Drug Issues, vol.
14 (1985), pp. 493-506.
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and report enforcement statistics. Central to the issue at hand in this report is the question of how
to measure changes in drug-related violence, and specifically drug trafficking-related violence.
Even an indicator that conceptually could provide some value added to the central question (to
choose an example popularly cited in the mediaviolent crimes excluding robberies) is difficult
to evaluate. For example, in Tucson, the number of violent crimes excluding robberies from
January to March of 2009 was 632; for the same period in 2008 the number was 651. So, there
were fewer violent crimes in Tucson in the first three months of 2009 than in 2008.84 These are
not necessarily drug trafficking-related violent crimes, but if the premisethat the United States
is experiencing spillover violence stemming from the drug trafficking activity in Mexicois
accurate, one would expect violent crimes to go up, and drug trafficking-related violent crimes
would be included in the more general violent crime reporting. On the other hand, a significant
drop in non-drug trafficking-related violence could obscure a rise in actual drug traffickingrelated violent crime. However, the true driver of the change in drug trafficking-related violent
crime cannot be ascertained from these statistics.
Another measurement issue is where to look for changes in drug-trafficking-related violence. This
is another area where the problems with available data are manifested. Ideally, to conduct this
analysis, one would have access to drug-trafficking-related violent crime data from the
geographic areas of interest (border and interior locations with known drug trafficking activity).
This data would be available in small geographic increments so that local differences could be
taken into account, and it would be consistently available in comparable sets across an adequately
long time period so as to conduct a statistically significant trend analysis. Unfortunately, this and
other data are not readily available for analysis, as detailed in the section outlining the
Congressional Research Services (CRSs) evaluation of available data.
Is There Spillover Violence?
As discussed, a multitude of factors are involved in both defining as well as measuring spillover
violence. Currently, there is no comprehensive, publicly available data that can definitively
answer the question of whether there has been a significant spillover of drug trafficking-related
violence into the United States. Although anecdotal reports have been mixed, U.S. government
officials maintain that there has not yet been a significant spillover.
Analysis
In an examination of data that could provide insight into whether there has been a significant
spillover in drug trafficking-related violence from Mexico into the United States, CRS undertook
an analysis of violent crime data from the FBIs Uniform Crime Report (UCR) program.85 Of
note, however, the UCR data does not allow analysts to determine what proportion of the violent
crime rate is related to drug trafficking or, even more specifically, what proportion of drug
trafficking-related violent crimes can be attributed to spillover violence. The UCR compiles data

84 Gabriel Arana, Theres No Drug Crime Wave at the Border, Just a lot of Media Hype, The Nation, May 29, 2009.
85 The UCR is most commonly referenced when discussing crime rates, and for the purpose of this report, we present
and analyze crime rates as reported by the UCR program. For more information on how crime in the United States is
measured and on the UCR program, see archived CRS Report RL34309, How Crime in the United States Is Measured,
by Nathan James and Logan Rishard Council. See also http://www.fbi.gov/ucr/ucr.htm.
Southwest Border Violence: Issues in Identifying and Measuring Spillover Violence
Congressional Research Service 22
from monthly reports from approximately 17,000 local police departments or state agencies, and
it provides some of the most commonly cited crime statistics in the United States. Under the UCR
program, the FBI collects data on the number of offenses known to police, the number and
characteristics of persons arrested, and the number of clearances for eight different offenses,
collectively referred to as Part I offenses. Part I offenses include murder and nonnegligent
manslaughter, forcible rape, robbery, aggravated assault, burglary, larceny-theft, motor vehicle
theft, and arson.86 Within the Part I offenses, crimes are categorized as either violent or property
crimes. Violent crimes include murder and nonnegligent manslaughter, forcible rape, robbery, and
aggravated assault. Property crimes include burglary, larceny-theft, motor vehicle theft, and
arson. The UCR, however, is not a comprehensive source for data on crime in the United States.
It collects offense data on a limited number of crimes (Part I crimes), which means that offense
data are available only for a small number of all crimes committed in the United States. For
instance, it does not include data on kidnappingone of the oft-cited drug trafficking-related
crimes discussed as evidence of spillover violence. Further, the inclusivity of the UCR data is
affected by other factors such as whether or not local law enforcement chooses to report data to
the FBI, the variety in reporting and data classification practices of local law enforcement
agencies, and the imputation methods used by the FBI to estimate crime in jurisdictions that have
not reported for an entire year.87
For the purpose of this report, CRS presents and analyzes violent crime rates as reported by the
UCR program, as policy makers have repeatedly expressed concern about the possibility of drug
trafficking-related violent crimes increasing.88 In addition to providing the overall national violent
and property crime rates annually, the UCR program also provides these crime rates for
metropolitan statistical areas (MSAs).89 In the present analysis of violent crime rate data, CRS
relies upon the violent crime rate data for the MSAs as calculated by the UCR program. As
mentioned, the violent crime rate includes murder and nonnegligent manslaughter, forcible rape,
robbery, and aggravated assault.
As mentioned, the NDIC estimated in its 2009 threat assessment that Mexican DTOs maintain
drug distribution networksor supply drugs to distributors in at least 230 U.S. cities (as

86 The FBI also collects data on the number of arrests made for 21 other offenses, known as Part II offenses. Part II
offenses include Other Assaults; Forgery and Counterfeiting; Fraud, Embezzlement; Stolen Property: Buying,
Receiving, or Possessing; Vandalism; Weapons: Carrying, Possessing, etc.; Prostitution and Commercialized Vice; Sex
Offenses; Drug Abuse Violations; Gambling; Offenses Against the Family and Children; Driving Under the Influence;
Liquor Laws; Drunkenness; Disorderly Conduct; Vagrancy; All Other Offenses; Suspicion; Curfew and Loitering Laws
(Persons under 18); and Runaways (Persons under 18).
87 For more information, see archived CRS Report RL34309, How Crime in the United States Is Measured, by Nathan
James and Logan Rishard Council.
88 This does not exclude the possibility that policy makers may be equally concerned with drug trafficking-related
property crimes. However, this report focuses on violent crimes. For information on national trends in both violent and
property crime rates, see CRS Report R40812, Federal Crime Control Issues in the 111th Congress, by Kristin M.
Finklea.
89 The Office of Management and Budget (OMB) defines MSAs as having at least one urbanized area of 50,000 or
more in population, plus adjacent territory that has a high degree of social and economic integration with the core as
measured by commuting ties. For more information, see Executive Office of the President, Office of Management and
Budget, Update of Statistical Area Definitions and Guidance on Their Uses, OMB Bulletin No. 10-02, December 1,
2009, http://www.whitehouse.gov/omb/assets/bulletins/b10-02.pdf. The FBI, in its annual report, provides violent
crime rates for MSAs. It does not provide violent crime rates for cities in this annual report. Violent crime rates for
cities are available using the FBIs UCR data tool; however, these data are not as current as data available through the
annual reports. As such, CRS has chosen to analyze MSA violent crime rate data available in the annual UCR reports.
Southwest Border Violence: Issues in Identifying and Measuring Spillover Violence
Congressional Research Service 23
illustrated in Figure 2).90 It was later noted that DTOs have expanded operations and are present
in at least 1,286 U.S. cities.91 Because this information is assimilated based on state and local law
enforcement agency estimations, as well as law enforcement interviews with NDIC staff, this is
not necessarily a comprehensive or nuanced picture of Mexican drug trafficking presence in cities
around the United States. For instance, while some cities may experience a larger amount of drug
trafficking activity than others, these cities are considered as equally experiencing drug
trafficking presence for the purpose of the NDIC estimate. In addition, there may be other cities
not reporting the presence of DTOs, even if these organizations are active in those cities. If drug
trafficking-related violence is in fact increasing in those cities reporting a presence of Mexican
DTOs, one may expect to see an increase in such violence in the cities identified by the NDIC
or perhaps only in those cities that are situated along the SWB if the violence is truly spilling
directly across the border. Further, if this increase in violence were to follow a similar time frame
as the escalating violence in Mexico, one may expect to see an increase in violence since
December 2006, when former Mexican President Felipe Caldern took office and began to crack
down on the DTOs.92 For each of the 230 cities cited by the NDICs 2009 threat assessment as
having Mexican DTO presence, CRS determined whether there was a corresponding MSA and
violent crime rate reported in the UCR for that MSA.93 CRS identified 138 such MSAs, 8 of
which directly abut the border between the United States and Mexico.94 CRS refers to these 8 as
the border MSAs and the other 130 MSAs that do not directly abut the U.S.-Mexico border as
the non-border MSAs. As illustrated in Figure 3, CRS calculated the average violent crime rate
across the border MSAs and the non-border MSAs for each of the years 1999 through 2011.

90 NDTA, 2009., p. 45.
91 Of these operations, 143 are reported to be controlled directly by DTO members in Mexico. See Mexican Cartels
Migrating to the USA, Borderland Beat, April 11, 2011, http://www.borderlandbeat..html. See also Anthony Kimery, Mexican DTOs Symbols, Other Identifiers Described in Intel
Bulletin, Homeland Security Today, February 11, 2011, http://www.hstoday.us/blogs/the-kimery-report/blog/mexicandtos-symbols-other-identifiers-described-in-intel-bulletin/fca4201347ffe1c131d3f71e57c604ab.html.
92 See CRS Report R41576, Mexicos Drug Trafficking Organizations: Source and Scope of the Rising Violence, by
June S. Beittel.
93 CRS is relying upon the 230 cities named in the 2009 NDIC threat assessment because NDIC did not publicly
identify the names of the at least 1,286 U.S. cities more recently noted as having DTO presence.
94 These MSAs include the cities of San Diego, CA; El Centro, CA; Yuma, AZ; Las Cruces, NM; El Paso, TX; Laredo,
TX; McAllen, TX; and Brownsville, TXall which were identified by the NDIC as having the presence of Mexican
drug trafficking organizations.
Southwest Border Violence: Issues in Identifying and Measuring Spillover Violence
Congressional Research Service 24
Figure 3. Violent Crime Rate in Selected MSAs
19992011
Source: CRS analysis and presentation of UCR data. UCR data is available from the Federal Bureau of
Investigation at http://www.fbi.gov/ucr/ucr.htm. Preliminary data are only available for the first half of 2012 and
thus are not included.
Notes: The UCR data is based on the average violent crime rate data across selected MSAs. The selected MSAs
are those that correspond to cities identified by the NDICs 2009 threat assessment as having a presence of
Mexican drug trafficking organizations. Border MSAs (N = 8) are those which directly abut the border between
the United States and Mexico, and non-border MSAs (N = 130) are those which do not touch the SWB. The
national violent crime rate is presented as a point of reference. CRS performed an ANOVA comparing the
average violent crime rate between border and non-border MSAs across years 1999 through 2011. The data
indicate that there is no evidence of a statistically significant difference between violent crime rates in border and
non-border MSAs, F(1,24) = 2.23, p > .05.
CRS analysis of available data suggests that the violent crime rate has not significantly increased
in those areas where there is an identified presence of Mexican DTOs, as well as available data on
the violent crime rate for those MSAs. Further, such analysis suggests there is no statistically
significant difference in the average violent crime rate in these border and non-border MSAs
between the years 1999 and 2011. Since 2001, the average violent crime rate in the eight selected
border MSAs has generally declined, and it has remained below the national violent crime rate
since 2005.95 It is unknown, however, whether trends in the violent crime rate are related to
changes in drug trafficking-related violent crimes. Because the violent crime rate is a compilation
of violent crimes both related and unrelated to drug trafficking, an increase in drug traffickingrelated violent crime could be masked by a decrease in those violent crimes not related to
traffickingor vice versa.
Looking at the aggregate of border and non-border MSAs, however, may not provide information
as to trends in individual MSAs or cities. For example, Figure 4 illustrates the trends in violent

95 In 2005, the national violent crime rate was 469 and the average violent crime rate across the selected border MSAs
was 465.9.
Southwest Border Violence: Issues in Identifying and Measuring Spillover Violence
Congressional Research Service 25
crime rates in eight border MSAs. As mentioned, if spillover violence were to trend in time with
the escalating violence in Mexico, analysts may expect to see an increase in drug traffickingrelated violence between 2007 and 2011 relative to previous years. For instance, although one
MSAEl Paso, TXexperienced an increase in the violent crime rate in 2007, 2008, 2009, and
2010 compared to 2006, the violent crime rate in the El Paso MSA remained lower than the
violent crime rate in that MSA from 1999-2004. Further, when drug trafficking-related violence
peaked in Mexico in 2011, the violent crime rate in El Paso dropped, as did the violent crime rate
in six of the seven other border MSAs depicted in Figure 4. These trends may be counterintuitive
to some who expect that a spillover in violence may touch those cities closest in proximity to
the violence in Mexico.96
Figure 4. Violent Crime Rate in Selected Southwest Border MSAs
1999-2011
Source: CRS analysis and presentation of UCR data. UCR data is available from the Federal Bureau of
Investigation at http://www.fbi.gov/ucr/ucr.htm. Preliminary data are only available for the first half of 2012 and
thus are not included.
Notes: The selected MSAs are those that correspond to cities identified by the NDICs 2009 threat assessment
as having a presence of Mexican drug trafficking organizations. The national violent crime rate is presented as a
point of reference.
Spillover violence may not occur uniformly across the entire SWB during the same time periods.
There may be hot-spot flare-ups in response to Mexican drug trafficking activity directly across
the border. If this were true, violence would have climbed in Laredo, TX, in 2004 and 2005 when

96 Samuel Logan, Mexican Drug Cartel Recruitment of Teenagers in the USA, Mexidata.Info, December 14, 2009,
http://mexidata.info/id2495.html.
Southwest Border Violence: Issues in Identifying and Measuring Spillover Violence
Congressional Research Service 26
there was an increase in drug trafficking-related violence across the border in Nuevo Laredo. It
did not. Also using this hot-spot analysis, the more recent increase in violence in Ciudad Juarez
should be linked to an increase in violence in El Paso, TX, between 2008 and 2010. In this case,
an increase in violence in a Mexican city does appear to be correlated with an increase in violence
in a neighboring U.S. city. This further illustrates that relying on trends in overall violent crime
rates may not provide an accurate depiction of trends in violent crime (or more specifically, in
drug trafficking-related violent crime) around the country.
Another possibility is that there may be a time lag between drug trafficking-related violence in
Mexico and any associated violence in the United States. For instance, after settling territorial
disputes in Mexico, rival DTOs may engage in violent conflict on the U.S. side of the border.
With the data available, however, it is not possible to separate out a time lag from other factors
that may influence levels of drug trafficking-related violence that may be seen in the United
States.
Conclusion
Mexico has experienced an elevated level of drug trafficking-related violence within and between
the drug trafficking organizations (DTOs), and the number of drug trafficking-related deaths in
Mexico between December 2006 (when then-Mexican President Felipe Caldern began his
campaign against the DTOs) and December 2012 (when the Caldern administration ended) has
been estimated at somewhere between 45,000 and 55,000.97 Congress remains concerned with the
possibility that the current drug trafficking-related violence in Mexico may spill over into the
Untied States. One of the primary challenges in assessing this violence is defining the term
spillover. While the interagency community has defined spillover violence as violence targeted
primarily at civilians and government entitiesexcluding trafficker-on trafficker-violenceother
experts and scholars have as central to spillover.
When defining and analyzing changes in drug trafficking-related violence within the United
States to determine whether there has been (or may be in the future) any spillover violence,
critical elements include who may be implicated in the violence (both perpetrators and victims),
what type of violence may arise, when violence may appear, and where violence may occur (both
along the Southwest border and in the nations interior).
At present, there is no comprehensive, publicly available data that can definitively answer the
question of whether there has been a significant spillover of drug trafficking-related violence into
the United States. Although anecdotal reports have been mixed, U.S. government officials
maintain that there has not yet been a significant spillover. CRS analyzed violent crime data from
the Federal Bureau of Investigations (FBIs) Uniform Crime Report program in order to examine
data that could provide insight into whether there has been a significant spillover in drug
trafficking-related violence from Mexico into the United States. However, the overall violent
crime data do not allow CRS to determine the proportion of violent crimes that are related to drug
trafficking or, even more specifically, the proportion of drug trafficking-related violent crimes
that are attributable to spillover violence. In its analysis, CRS calculated the average violent crime
rate across eight selected Metropolitan Statistical Areas (MSAs) along the Southwest border and
130 selected non-border MSAsidentified by the National Drug Intelligence Center (NDIC) as

97 University of San Diego, Trans-Border Institute, Drug Violence in Mexico: Data and Analysis Through 2012,
February 2013.
Southwest Border Violence: Issues in Identifying and Measuring Spillover Violence
Congressional Research Service 27
having the presence of Mexican DTOsfor each of the years 1999 through 2011. CRS analysis
suggests that the violent crime rate has not significantly increased in those areas where there is an
identified presence of Mexican DTOs. Further, there appears to be no significant difference in the
average violent crime rate in the selected border and non-border MSAs between the years 1999
and 2011. In conclusion, however, because the trends in the overall violent crime rate may not be
indicative of trends in drug trafficking-related violent crimes, CRS is unable to develop factbased conclusions about trends in drug trafficking-related violence spilling over from Mexico into
the United States.
Author Contact Information
Kristin M. Finklea
Specialist in Domestic Security
[email protected], 7-6259

Acknowledgments
Jennifer Lake, William Krouse, and Marc Rosenblum, as well as former CRS analysts Mark Randol, Chad
Haddal, Mark Eddy, and Celinda Franco, contributed to an earlier version of this report.

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